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THE GLOBAL MARKET AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: TRADING AWAY THE HUMAN
RIGHTS PRINCIPLE
Frank J. Garcia*
I. INTRODUCTION
The task set for this Article is to consider the impact
which the globalization of markets may have on the effective-
ness of international human rights law. But what is globaliza-
tion? By comparison, the term "international human rights" is
relatively easier to categorize,' and in this Article shall be
used principally in the positive sense to denote the basic legal
rights enumerated in the first twenty articles of the Universal
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1. In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that the concept of international
human rights is simple, uncontroversial, and has precise limits-that is far from
the case. See generally Joy Gordon, The Concept of Human Rights: The History
and Meaning of its Politicization, 23 BROOK. J. INTL L. 689 (1998) (reviewing the
concept, and asserting its oddness, political history and inconsistency); Anthony
D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1110 (1982). Commentators have objected to the uncertain boundaries of the con-
cept, as well as to inherent gender and culture biases. See, e.g., Philip Alston,
Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INTL
L. 607, 607 (1984) (criticizing the "haphazard" expansion of the term); Celina Ro-
many, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in
International Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 88 (1993) (arguing
that the concept of human rights rests on discredited public/private distinction);
Sompong Sucharitkul, A Multi-Dimensional Concept of Human Rights in Interna-
tional Law, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 305, 305 (1987) (discussing European bias of
basic human rights instruments). I mean only that it is relatively easier to have
some assurance that we know what the term is referring to in discourse, at least
when employed in a positive sense, in comparison to the term "globalization," as I
discuss below. See infra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Declaration of Human Rights.2 Such rights include the right to
life, liberty and the security of one's person; the right to free-
dom from slavery or servitude; the right to freedom from tor-
ture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; the right to
equality before the law; and the right to own property.3 But
globalization? As many commentators have pointed out, "glob-
alization" is a rather vague, "loose and overstretched" term
which can be used to mean many things or, perhaps, nothing
at all.4 And why think about the impact of globalization, in
particular the globalization of markets, on human rights law,
rather than the impact of some other international trend? Is it
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. I, 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. An alter-
native list of "core" rights might consist, for example, of the rights listed in Sec-
tion 702 of the Restatement. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1986) (customary international law recognizes
prohibitions against, inter alia, genocide, slavery, murder or disappearance of indi-
viduals, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimina-
tion). International human rights includes other rights, of course, such as those
enumerated in the two U.N. covenants, often referred to as "second-generation"
rights. These are set forth in and enforced through other instruments and mecha-
nisms, such as regional human rights conventions, specialized tribunals, national
courts, and state initiatives such as international diplomacy, and economic coer-
cion.
The term "international human rights" can also be used in a normative
sense to refer to the bundle of related concepts in moral and political theory used
to justify positive legal rights, such as natural law, natural rights and moral
rights. This Article shall endeavor in its use of the term to distinguish the posi-
tive law from its normative justification. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying
text. The term can also be used in a historical or sociological sense with reference
to the post-war human rights movement, and in an aspirational sense as repre-
senting an ideal of human dignity protected through law. See generally Burns
Weston, Human Rights, in 20 NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (15th ed. 1993).
3. UDHR, supra note 2, arts. 3-5, 7, 17.
4. Rudolph Dolzer, Global Environmental Issues: The Genuine Area of Global-
ization, 7 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 157, 157 (1998) ("Behind the loose and over-
stretched notion of globalization are both quantitatively and qualitatively different
phenomena in economic, cultural, and environmental international relations."). See
also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Introduction, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1993);
S. Tamer Cavusgil, Globalization of Markets and its Impact on Domestic Institu-
tions, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 83, 84 (1993); Jost Delbrfick, Globalization of
Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic Law-A European Perspec-
tive, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 9-10 (1993); Miguel de la Madrid H., Na-
tional Sovereignty and Globalization, 19 HOUS. J. IN'L L. 553, 555-60 (1997);
Alberto Tita, Globalization: A New Political and Economic Space Requiring Supra-
national Governance, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 47 (1998). For a thorough review of the
history and uses of the term, see Tahirih V. Lee, Swallowing the Dragon? Some
Directions for Research on Globalization Theory and Legal and Economic Restruc-
turing in East Asia, AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 1999).
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simply because we presume that "human rights," being in
some non-trivial way about human beings," are therefore
likely to be influenced by any important change in human self-
understanding and social activity, such as market globalization
may represent? Or do we intuit that there is something partic-
ular about market globalization which leads us to suspect that
it will have a unique and important impact on the effectiveness
of human rights law, one that is worth examining carefully?
Taking the last question first, this Article begins with the
premise that something unique and important with respect to
human rights is in fact going on in the process of globalization,
in particular when one distinguishes between the economic
facts of market globalization and its regulatory infrastruc-
ture.5 While market globalization may represent in some as-
pects a unique opportunity for human rights law, the globaliza-
tion of the market economy may also pose a threat to the con-
tinued effectiveness of human rights law, just as the rise of the
market economy itself has been blamed for leading to condi-
tions requiring the formal development of human rights law.6
The regulatory framework which international economic law
provides for globalization operates according to a view of hu-
man nature, human values and moral decision-making funda-
mentally at odds with the view of human nature, human val-
ues and moral decision-making which underlies international
human rights law. The human rights movement could thus
find in market globalization the ultimate victory of a regulato-
ry system that, by nature and operation, cannot properly take
into account what the human rights movement holds most
dear: that underlying positive human rights laws are moral
5. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
6. "Modern markets also created a whole new range of threats to human
dignity and thus were one of the principal sources of the need and demand for
human rights." JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 64 (1989). It may be, for example, that the globalization of markets erodes
the social and normative preconditions for human rights protection, as well as for
the market itself. Hausman & McPherson point out that core trade and economic
values such as economic efficiency depend upon ethical values which paradoxically
may be undermined by market economies. See Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S.
McPherson, Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and Contemporary Moral Philoso-
phy, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 671 (1993). Hausman & McPherson list honesty,
trust and goodwill as three values critical to the efficient function of markets,
which may in fact be undermined by appeals to rational self-interest, at least in
certain forms. Id. at 673.
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entitlements that ground moral, political, and legal claims of
special force,7 claims which must be morally and legally prior
to society and the state.' They are "[u]nalienable."9 It is this
inalienability and priority of human rights which this Article
refers to as the "human rights principle" justifying internation-
al human rights law, and it is this principle which is at risk of
being "traded away," if you will, when human rights laws and
the claims and values they presuppose, come into conflict with
trade law and trade values in the new tribunals of globaliza-
tion, in particular the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dis-
pute settlement mechanism.'0
In proposing that the effects of market globalization on
human rights law be analyzed as a normative conflict in WTO
dispute resolution, I am suggesting that this sort of problem is
in fact a problem of justice." In other words, the legal and
institutional mechanisms created to facilitate and respond to
market globalization, and the legal and institutional mecha-
nisms created to define and protect human rights, both involve
7. DONNELLY, supra note 6, at 9.
8. Id. at 70.
9. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
10. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Dec. 15, 1993, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]; See gener-
ally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade
Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System Since
1948, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1157 (1994) (reviewing the structure and function
of the WTO dispute settlement process).
11. Globalization has a recognized normative aspect. See Alex Y. Seita, Global-
ization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INTL L.J. 429, 431 (1997)
("globalization is an important source of common economic and political values for
humanity"); Delbriick, supra note 4, at 11 (the term globalization itself is often
used as a normative term, in that it presupposes a value judgement "that the
common good is to be served by measures that are to be subsumed under the
notion of globalization"). In particular, the conflicts which globalization can engen-
der between trade law and other bodies of law, such as environmental law and
labor law are inescapably normative. See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 658, 672-73, 680 (1996). On the applicability of normative theo-
ry to international relations, see CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTER-
NATIONAL RELATIONS 5 (1979); STANLEY HOFFMANN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS: ON
THE LIMITS AND PoSsmILrIES OF ETHICAL INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1 (1981); An-
thony D'Amato, International Law and Rawls' Theory of Justice, 5 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POLY 525, 525 (1975); Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Justice: Linking the Trade
Linkage Debates, 19 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 391, 395-406 (1998); Alfred P. Rubin,
Political Theory and International Relations, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 403 (1980) (review
of BEITZ 1979).
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public order decisions as to the allocation of social benefits and
burdens, and the correction of improper gain. 2 The funda-
mental normative goal of every such public order decision is
justice, which is to say that such decisions are to be made in
accordance with, and their outcomes must reflect, our basic
moral and political principles. 3
Considered broadly, globalization has the potential to
promote broad, if not universal, international consensus on the
basic principles of Western liberalism: free markets, democrat-
ic government, and human rights. 4 However, within this
broadly framed liberalism the various components can them-
selves come into conflict through the very process of globaliza-
tion which brings them into the ascendant. Moreover, inter-
national problems of justice such as the market-globaliza-
tion/human rights conflict present unique difficulties, in that
they reflect a central feature, if not defect, of the international
governance system, namely that the pursuit of global justice is
splintered into a myriad of treaties and institutions, in this
case into two distinct regimes, one concerned with economic
justice and one with human dignity. Therefore, the inquiry into
the effects of market globalization on human rights law be-
comes an inquiry into how the economic facts and regulatory
infrastructure of globalization enhance, or interfere with, the
contributions which international human rights law seeks to
12. This? is Aristotle's classic subdivision of Plato's general concept of justice
as Right Order into its main constituent parts, which distinction continues in
influence to the present day. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V., chs.
2, 4, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 400, 404-07 (Richard McKeon ed., 1947); Alan
Ryan, Introduction, in JUSTICE 1, 9 (Alan Ryan ed., 1993) (citing the continuing
influence of this categorization).
13. See Garcia, supra note 11, at 395-96.
14. See Seita, supra note 11, at 431.
15. Commentators recognize the inevitability of conflict between the various
elements of a globalized liberalism, such as free markets and human rights. See,
e.g., Seita, supra note 11, at 470 ("[Tihe basic values that globalization spreads
can sometimes be at odds with each other and with other important values.");
Nichols, supra note 11, at 672-73 ("At any given point in time a society will pos-
sess more than one value. These values may, in fact, conflict with one another.
Thus, it is possible for a country to hold a value of enhancing wealth through
international trade and at the same time hold values that conflict with the pre-
cepts of free trade.") (footnotes omitted). Moreover, where a market is dominated
by ethnic minorities, globalization may lead an anti-democratic and anti-market
backlash by impoverished ethnic majorities, with disasterous human rights conse-
quences. See generally Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a
New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1 (1998).
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make towards the attainment of justice. The conflicts engen-
dered by this bifurcation, particularly in view of the preemi-
nence of international economic law,16 must be addressed in
order that we may avoid undoing with the tools of economic
liberal justice what we have accomplished with the tools of
rights-based liberal justice.
After a brief discussion of globalization introducing a dis-
tinction between "transactional" and "regulatory" globalization
and their differing impact on human rights, this Article turns
in Part III to a discussion of the normative conflict underlying
globalization/human rights disputes, which this Article charac-
terizes as reflecting the conflict between consequentialist and
deontological forms of moral decision-making and justification.
This Article then turns to an analysis of the disposition of
globalization/human rights disputes in the WTO, illustrating
how the trade-oriented nature of such an institution, coupled
with the underlying normative conflict in such disputes, work
to disadvantage laws based on human rights claims in that
forum. Finally, this Article offers some suggestions as to how
WTO doctrine could be amended or interpreted so as to resolve
trade-human rights disputes in a manner more in keeping with
the human rights principle.
II. GLOBALIZATION
As was indicated above, the term "globalization" can have
many meanings. 7 Taken most broadly, globalization repre-
sents the sum total of political, social, economic, legal and
symbolic processes rendering the division of the globe into
national boundaries increasingly less important for the pur-
pose of individual meaning and social decision. 8 "Globaliza-
tion" thus in fact contains many smaller "globalizations," which
16. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution,
17 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 33, 35-36 (1996).
17. See supra note 4 and works cited therein.
18. See, e.g., Seita, supra note 11, at 429 ("Globalization . . . is a multifaceted
concept encompassing a wide range of seemingly disparate processes, activities,
and conditions . . . connected together by one common theme: what is geographi-
cally meaningful now transcends national boundaries and is expanding to cover the
entire planet. Globalization has led to an awareness that international issues, not
just domestic ones, matter."); Aman, supra note 4, at 1-2 ("In our view,
'globalization' refers to complex, dynamic legal and social processes .... Today,
the line between domestic and international is largely illusory.").
[Vol. XXV: I
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can both "reinforce and clash with one another."19
Globalization is often defined principally in economic
terms, namely as the globalization of markets." Since we are
also concerned in this context with the globalization of mar-
kets, a good starting point is to begin with the idea of a mar-
ket. In this Article, the term "market" shall be used in the
rather traditional sense of a series or system of private interac-
tions involving voluntary exchanges of goods, services, labor
and capital, the four basic economic factors of production.2'
What we are concerned with, then, is to understand what is
meant by the "globalization" of mechanisms for the private
exchange of the factors of production, and the effects of this
globalization on human rights.
In considering the globalization of the market, one can
distinguish between the geographic facts of globalization, and
the regulatory predicates and consequences of such globaliza-
tion. One definition of market globalization, which this Article
terms "transactional globalization," views the globalization of
markets as an increase in the number of transactions involving
goods, services, labor and capital which cross national bound-
aries, such that they come to resemble in operation a single
market spanning the globe.22 This definition assumes that
there has always been a certain amount of transboundary
economic activity, but that such activity is increasing both in
scope and scale such as to warrant the tag "globalization," thus
saying in essence that globalization is a quantitative rather
than a qualitative change.'
19. Seita, supra note 11, at 429 (emphasis added).
20. See Seita, supra note 11, at 429-30. However, other commentators point
out that globalization involves significant non-economic processes, and Seita himself
points out that "[diemocracy and human rights are, for example, as much a part
of globalization as are free market principles." Aman, supra note 4, at 1; Delbriick,
supra note 4, at 9-10; Seita, supra note 11, at 429.
21. I will not be addressing "markets" in the specialized or analogic sense, as
the term is employed in analyzing such phenomena as the "market for control" in
private firms, or the "regulatory market."
22. See, e.g., Seita, supra note 11, at 439 (discussing economic globalization as
the "expansion of markets for goods, services, financial capital, and intellectual
property"); Cavusgil, supra note 4, at 83 ("Globalization of markets involves the
growing interdependency among the economies of the world; multinational nature
of sourcing, manufacturing, trading, and investment activities; increasing frequency
of cross-border transactions and financing; and heightened intensity of competition
among a larger number of players.").
23. See Dolzer, supra note 4, at 157 (stating that "[iln the economic sphere,
1999]
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This common approach to defining economic globalization,
however, represents only one aspect of economic globalization.
Another definition, which shall be termed "regulatory global-
ization," includes the quantitative changes identified in trans-
actional globalization, but emphasizes a qualitative change in
the nature of our regulation of markets. In particular, regula-
tory globalization focuses on the complex social processes
which have led to the regulation of markets for goods, labor,
capital and services at new levels, levels which require formal-
ized interstate cooperation through new and powerful institu-
tions like the WTO, and which may, in certain cases, transcend
nation-state control to a significant degree, as in the case of
the European Community.2 4
The question before us, then, can be framed as an inquiry
into the ways in which each of these "market globalizations"
affects the vitality and effectiveness of human rights law. Be-
fore turning to the possible adverse effects of regulatory global-
ization on human rights law, which is the principal focus of
this Article, a few words about the effects of transactional
globalization, and the positive effects of regulatory globaliza-
tion, are in order. To begin with, globalization of both types
may in certain respects represent an unparalleled opportunity
for enhancing the exercise and protection of human rights. For
example, transactional globalization can contribute directly to
the enjoyment of economic rights, due to the relationship be-
tween economic activity and the human freedom and dignity
we express in our decisions as producers and consumers."
Indirectly, transactional globalization may enhance the effec-
tiveness of human rights law by contributing to the attainment
of the economic preconditions for socioeconomic rights through
globalization is not a novel phenomenon, but relates to the pace of change that
has increased dramatically") (emphasis added).
24. See Trachtman, supra note 16, at 46-55 (reviewing history of regulatory
changes in international economic law); Delbriick, supra note 4, at 10-11, 17 (ex-
plaining globalization as signifying changes in the locus of regulation); Aman,
supra note 4, at 2 (emphasizing change in dynamics of law formation wrought by
globalization).
25. As the trade liberalization attendant to globalization reduces governmental
barriers to private economic decision-making, individuals have an increased scope
for realizing such economic rights. See Robert W. McGee, The Fatal Flaw in
NAFTA, GATT and All Other Trade Agreements, 14 NW. J. INTL L. & Bus. 549,
560-61 (1994) (criticizing protectionist unfair-trade remedies as impermissibly re-
stricting consumer rights).
[Vol. XXV:I
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the significant increases in global welfare which trade theory
predicts should follow such globalization." Furthermore,
transactional globalization can contribute to the enforcement of
human rights, through the effects which increased contact
between the citizens of oppressive regimes and the citizens and
products of rights-protective regimes may have on the continu-
ing viability of oppressive regimes." Participation in the mar-
ket itself may increase domestic pressure for increased political
and social rights.28 Finally, there is the possibility, at least,
that the significant economic power unleashed through trans-
actional globalization and the interdependent economies it
encourages, might be marshaled in the form of economic sanc-
tions against human rights violations.29
26. Transactional globalization represents at least an apparent vindication on
a global level of basic free trade principles. This should mean that, as imperfec-
tions in the market are worked out and the regulatory system strengthened, we
should be poised to witness significant improvements in global welfare, as individ-
uals gain in economic liberty and material prosperity as a result of the operation
of free trade principles globally. See Nichols, supra note 11, at 661-67 (summariz-
ing the contributions which free trade can make to human well-being). Such im-
provements enhance the conditions for the attainment of socioeconomic rights, such
as the right to employment and the right to a decent standard of living, and the
conditions for human rights protection generally. See UDHR, supra note 2, art. 22
("Everyone, as a member of society, . . . is entitled to realization, through national
effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and
resources of each state, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable
for his dignity . . ").
27. The revolution in information and communications technologies involved in
globalization has brought people in rights-protective regimes face to face with
human rights crises thousands of miles away. See Seita, supra note 11, at 455-60
(surveying links between communication technology and democracy and human
rights). Globalization can thus make it more difficult for persistent violators to
maintain the cloak of secrecy and deniability. Also, oppressive regimes are finding
it increasingly difficult to control the access to and spread of "subversive" informa-
tion and ideas in the information age. See, e.g., Upendra Baxi, Voices of Suffering
and the Future of Human Rights, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 160-
61 (citing the use of "cyberspace solidarity").
28. Liberalization in economics may lead to liberalization in politics as well,
as the economic liberalization required by globalization has a favorable spillover
effect on liberalization of domestic policies on speech, democratic participation, etc.
See Seita, supra note 11, at 453-54 (reviewing indirect impact of transactional
globalization on democratic and human rights values).
29. See Philip Alston, International Trade as an Instrument of Positive Human
Rights Policy, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 155, 168-70 (1982); Robert W. McGee, Trade Embar-
goes, Sanctions and Blockades: Some Overlooked Human Rights Issues, 32 J.
WORLD TRADE 139, 142 (1998); Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an
Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the
World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 42-45 (1996). On the
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Regulatory globalization can also have several positive
effects on human rights. First, there is the fact that globaliza-
tion has been facilitated and managed by an increase in the
rule of law in international economic relations." Therefore,
since a commitment to the rule of law is integral to human
rights law as well as the international economic law system,
regulatory globalization has contributed in a significant way
towards establishing a key regulatory goal of human rights law
as well.
Second, there has been some recognition at the regulatory
level of the importance of considering human rights in connec-
tion with the operation of trade and integration rules and
systems. At the mulilateral level, for example, both GATT 1947
and GATT 1994' contain an exception to the most-favored-
nation (MFN) and national treatment principles32 recognizing
a state's right to ban the importation of products of prison la-
bor.33 The WTO has publicly, albeit weakly, affirmed the im-
portance of observance of international labor standards, while
pushing the onus of the development of appropriate standards
to the ILO.34 Regionally, one can point to the formation of the
NAFTA Labor Commission, charged with monitoring the na-
tional enforcement of state labor laws. 5
use of economic sanctions generally, see Raj K Bhala, MRS. WATU: Seven Steps
to Trade Sanctions Analysis, MICH. J. INTL L. (forthcoming 1999) (proposing
eponymous algorithm for evaluating sanctions measures).
30. See Seita, supra note 11, at 430 (stating that "[l]aw has been important in
managing economic globalization and may become as important with respect to
political globalization"); John H. Jackson, International Economic Law: Reflections
on the 'Boilerroom" of International Relations, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 595,
596 (1995) (stating that -it is plausible to suggest that ninety percent of interna-
tional law work is in reality international economic law in some form or another").
31. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
(GATT 1947 was incorporated into the WTO as GATT 1994 in Annex IA to the
WTO Agreement) [hereinafter GATT].
32. GATT, arts. I, III. See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
33. Id. art. XX(e). See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
34. See World -Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO
Doc. WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W, Dec. 13, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 218 (1996) (WTO affirms com-
mitment to international labor standards but considers ILO to be appropriate
forum for trade and labor issues) [hereinafter Singapore Declaration].
35. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 8, 1993, Can.-
Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994); see, e.g., Elizabeth M.
Iglesias, Human Rights in International Economic Law: Locating Latinas/os in the
[Vol. XXV:I
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Finally, there has been some recognition at the regulatory
level of the powerful leverage which transactional globalization
places at the service of human rights reform and enforcement,
at least at the level of conditions on entry into regional trading
systems. For example, participation in the European Commu-
nity is contingent upon membership in and observance of trea-
ty-based human rights norms.36 This link has also been ob-
served, at least at the rhetorical level, in this hemisphere, in
the fact that the agreements launching the Free Trade Area of
the Americas cite the importance of democratic values and
human rights for hemispheric integration.37
For these reasons, human rights advocates could view both
transactional and regulatory globalization as unreservedly
advancing the cause of human rights on a global level. Howev-
er, due to the bifurcated nature of the international gover-
nance system into separate trade and human rights regimes,
and the fact that trade law and institutions are increasingly
called upon to resolve disputes involving areas outside of trade
law, the globalization of markets, at least in its regulatory
form, may in fact retard the effectiveness of human rights law.
Disputes between trade law and other bodies of law such as
human rights law which come before the institutions of regula-
tory globalization involve normative conflicts, in that they
represent disputes between trade values and non-trade values,
such as those values underlying human rights law.3" The de-
gree to which the law and institutions of regulatory globaliza-
tion can or cannot effectively take into account these non-trade
values, such as those values at stake in human rights claims
and enforcement measures, is therefore going to determine to a
Linkage Debates, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-Ahl. L. REV. 361, 369-71 (1997) (briefly de-
scribing treaty structure and shortcomings).
36. The link between European Community membership and participation in
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is an
historic and effective example. See James F. Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A
Necessary Linkage, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 793, 793, 817-23 (1994). This form of
conditionality is a part of EC expansion doctrine as well. Id.; Frank J. Garcia,
'Americas Agreements"-An Interim Stage in Building the Free Trade Area of the
Americas, 35 COLUMI. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63, 63, 92-93, 102-03 (1997).
37. Garcia, supra note 36, at 103. However, in our hemisphere the dominant
economic unit, the United States, has exerted a restraining rather than an activist
impulse in this regard. See Smith, supra note 36, at 806-17.
38. See Nichols, supra note 11, at 671-89 (analyzing linkage conflicts as value
conflicts).
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large extent the degree to which globalization is a friend or foe
to human rights.
III. REGULATORY GLOBALIZATION: UTILITY OVER RIGHTS
Understanding the adverse effects which market globaliza-
tion may have on human rights requires an understanding of
the changes in the way trade is now regulated through law. An
increasingly globalized economy has brought many new aspects
of global economic life into the ambit of trade law and trade
institutions, which in turn has facilitated the further globaliza-
tion of the marketplace.
A. Changes in the Global Regulation of Markets
The globalization of markets in transactional terms has
been facilitated by, and has in turn facilitated, a significant
change in the nature of the international regulation of econom-
ic activity. From its imperfect beginnings in the GATT 1947 to
its current apotheosis in the WTO, the revolution in interna-
tional economic law means that more aspects of the interna-
tional economy are regulated through treaty-based rules than
at any previous time, rules with less room for state discretion
and unilateral action than at any prior time, and under the
adjudicative supervision of stronger institutions than at any
other time. 9
One might at first, therefore, think that globalization has
been an unmitigated boon for international economic law. After
all, what regulatory system would not want to see the scope of
its jurisdiction vastly enlarged, and the effectiveness of its
norms enhanced? Because of this globalization, however, trade
law is now a more complicated business. In practice, the revo-
lution in international economic law has meant that institu-
tions created to adjudicate trade disputes are increasingly
being asked to resolve policy issues which involve not only
trade law, but other issues and values as well. There have
always been so-called trade linkage problems, which in prac-
tice raise questions about appropriate conditions under which
states may pursue non-trade domestic policy goals such as
39. See generally John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law,
17 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 17, 21-23 (1996) (assessing Uruguay Round as "wa-
tershed shift" in international economic regulation).
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national security and economic development, despite their
short or long-term adverse effects on trade.4" Now, however,
trade law and trade institutions are impacting more and more
areas of traditional domestic concern, such as environmental
protection,4 labor and employment standards,42 and cultural
identity.43
In the absence of an effective global legislative forum,
trade law and institutions will, for the time being and by de-
fault, be charged with resolving difficult linkage issues involv-
ing trade values and other values, and resolving them in an
adjudicative setting. The degree to which trade law and insti-
tutions are capable of adequately taking into account other
non-trade interests and values at the point of conflict, will
serve as the determining factor in the effect regulatory global-
ization has on the viability and vigor of human rights law in a
global market.
B. The Normative Conflict Between International Economic
Law and Human Rights Law
International human rights law and international econom-
ic law each have an important role in the implementation of a
just global order, and yet the principal normative foundations
of each regime are, if not incompatible, then at least in funda-
mental tension. The primary discipline for the analysis of in-
ternational economic relations, economics, and the dominant
40. See Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade
Order: Lessons From the Past, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
213 (Anne 0. Krueger ed., 1998), reprinted in 19 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 513
(1998) (discussing antecedents of current linkage issue).
41. See, e.g., World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report on United
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58AB/R, available in 1998 WL 720123 [hereinafter Shrimp Case]; Robert
Howse, The Turtles Panel: Another Environmental Disaster in Geneva, 32 J.
WORLD TRADE 73 (1998).
42. See Singapore Declaration, supra note 34 (reviewing WTO position on
trade and international labor standards); Virginia Leary, Workers' Rights and In-
ternational Trade: The Social Clause (GATT, ILO, NAFTA, U.S. Laws), in 2 FAIR
TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FAIR TRADE? 175 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
43. See World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report on Canada-Certain
Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, available in 1997 WL 398913; W.
Ming Shao, Is There No Business Like Show Business? Free Trade and Cultural
Protectionism, 20 YALE J. INTL L. 105, 105 (1995).
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model of international economic relations law, the Efficiency
Model, are based on a set of values and an approach to norma-
tive issues which are in conflict with the values and normative
approach underlying contemporary human rights law.
1. The Normative Underpinnings of Trade Law
Trade law is not simply about the exchange of goods. As is
the case with all human interaction which is structured by
law, trade law embodies a particular vision of justice, a theory
of what constitutes the Right Order as it applies within the
scope of economic law." Therefore, as with any particular ac-
count of justice, a normative account of trade law presupposes
a certain view of human nature, and favors a particular ap-
proach to moral reasoning.
The dominant normative account of trade law is an eco-
nomic one, which Jeffrey Dunoff has termed the "Efficiency
Model." In the Efficiency Model, trade law is exclusively con-
cerned with the twin values of economic efficiency and wel-
fare.45 The goal of trade law is to improve the economic well-
being of human beings through the facilitation of efficient
exchanges.46 This approach has several important implica-
tions for the viability of human rights law within a trade-based
regulatory regime.
44. I have elsewhere outlined the arguments in favor of this view, in an essay
drawn from a larger work in progress on the problem of justice in contemporary
international economic law. See Garcia, supra note 11.
45. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 347, 349-50 (1998). See also G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and Inter-
national Relations Theory, 44 DuKE L.J. 829, 877-85 (1995) (discussing what Shell
calls the "Efficient Market Model" of trade law).
46. See, e.g., DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXA-
TION 93 (3d ed. 1996).
Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally de-
votes its capital and labor to such employments as are most beneficial to
each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with
the universal good of the whole. By stimulating industry, by rewarding
ingenuity, and by using most efficaciously the peculiar powers bestowed
by nature, it distributes labor most effectively and most economically:
while by increasing the general mass of productions, it diffuses general
benefit and binds together, by common ties of interest and intercourse,
the universal society of nations throughout the civilized world.
Id.; JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 8-9 (2d ed. 1989) (efficiency-based increases in
general welfare are the preeminent goal of trade law).
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First, there is a marked tendency for other values besides
efficiency and welfare to be viewed as outside the scope of
trade law, and even inimical to its purposes.47 From the view-
point of Efficiency Model adherents, advocates of non-trade
values and issues are seen as trying to complicate the trade
law system with what are at best extraneous concerns such as
human rights or environmental protection," and what may be
at worst simply disguised protectionism.49 In adopting this
staice, Efficiency Model adherents fail to recognize that, while
efficiency and welfare are undeniably important values in
trade, their pursuit is necessarily part of an overarching effort
to establish a just global order, an order in which other values
are also central, values which are implicated and quite proper-
ly considered in trade law decisions. 0 In other words, there is
no such thing as a pure trade issue.
Second, economic analysis and methodology will exert a
dominant, if not overweening, influence on trade and non-trade
policy formed or implemented within trade institutions operat-
ing on an Efficiency Model. In noting this consequence, I do
not mean to question the relevance of economics for the pur-
poses of trade and trade law and policy. Economics will play a
critical role in trade law under any model, since economics
involves the study of resource decision-making, and trade law
47. See Nichols, supra note 11, at 700 ("That the trade regime gives primacy
to trade is evidenced throughout the history of GATT dispute settlement, as well
as in the writings of officials and scholars closely allied with the General Agree-
ment and the nascent World Trade Organization.").
48. See Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization and Social Issues, 28
J. WORLD TRADE 17, 23 (1994) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Social Issues] (citing objec-
tion by GATT and WTO members to efforts in 1991 and 1994 to begin work on
labor and environment issues on the basis that such issues were not trade issues);
Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures Against
Foreign Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUI-
SITES FOR FAIR TRADE?, 95, 108 (arguing that GATT has a good reason to be
skeptical of linkage claims).
49. See Charnovitz, Social Issues, supra note 48, at 32 ("Simplistic demands
for drastic trade remedies against so-called eco-dumping or social dumping some-
times bear a striking similarity to more conventional forms of protectionist rheto-
ric . . .") (quoting then-GATT Director General, Peter Sutherland).
50. See Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade-Free Trade
Debate: Trade, Labor and the Environment, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997) (observing that "[a]
visceral distrust of any or all demands for trade restrictions has impeded a careful
analysis of the kinds of normative claims at issue and has allowed fair traders to
characterize free traders as moral philistines").
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is a powerful engine for resource allocation. However, due to
the range of interests and values affected by the contemporary
international economic law system, other disciplines and mod-
els are unquestionably relevant to trade policy analysis and
formulation.
Moreover, in order to properly evaluate trade law's impact
on human rights and other non-trade areas, it is important to
remember that economics is not a value-free method of analy-
sis.5 Trade arguments are generally founded on some form of
welfare economics, and standard welfare economics rests on
strong and contestable moral presuppositions.52 To begin with,
economics employs, both descriptively and prescriptively, mod-
els and concepts which adopt a position on the nature of hu-
man beings, i.e., homo economicus 3 and the appropriate ends
of moral decision-making, preference satisfaction," which
calls into question the suitability of economics for the definitive
evaluation of non-economic values."
51. In the discussion which follows, I rely heavily on Hausman & McPherson,
supra note 6, for their analysis of the metaethics of economics.
52. Welfare economics typically translates normative questions into questions
of efficiency and equity. The traditional emphasis in welfare economics on efficien-
cy over equity may in fact reflect the perceived intractability of evaluating distrib-
utive fairness economically, rather than a clear analysis of the moral priority of
efficiency over equity. Moreover, the moral implications of analysis of welfare ques-
tions into equity and efficiency issues need to be addressed from a normative
perspective. Id. at 675.
53. Economics presupposes a model of human beings as homo economicus, as
rational self-interest maximizers. Id. at 688. In the words of John Stuart Mill,
political economy "is concerned with [man] solely as a being who desires to pos-
sess wealth .... It makes entire abstraction of every other human passion or
motive." John Stuart Mill, On the Definition of Political Economy; and On the
Method of Investigation Proper to It, 26 LONDON & WESTMINSTER REV. 1 (1836),
cited in DOUGLAS A- IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLEcTuAL HISTORY OF
FREE TRADE 180 n.1 (1996). On this view, trade is about maximizing self-interest
through economic exchange, and trade law is about facilitating conditions which
lead to the maximization of self-interest, by eliminating state-imposed barriers to
efficient exchanges.
54. In terms of the ends of moral decision-making, economists speak in terms
of individual well-being, and tend to equate well-being with preference satisfaction,
and therefore the morality of an act is equated with its ability to satisfy individu-
al preferences. See Hausman & McPherson, supra note 6, at 689.
55. However useful as an economic construct, the homo economicus model of
human behavior is troubling when viewed as an account of moral behavior, in that
it most closely resembles egoism, a much-criticized moral theory. Id. at 686-88.
Moreover, this model does not provide a rich enough picture of individual choice to
fully analyze moral behavior, for the reason that such a model precludes true
altruistic reasoning and tends to assimilate moral choice into preference satisfac-
19991 TRADING AWAY HUMAN RIGHTS 67
Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this Article,
the method of moral reasoning which normative economics
adopts is a type that is fundamentally at odds with the domi-
nant mode of moral reasoning underlying human rights law.
Economic moral reasoning is consequentialist in nature, in
that it focuses on outcomes, and not on procedures or acts on
their own terms.56 Consequentialism is the term for ethical
theories which evaluate the rightness or wrongness of an act
solely in terms of its consequences.57 On this view, an act will
be morally right if its consequences are" better than those of
any alternative acts." Different types of consequentialist the-
ory differ on what precisely better consequences consist of. 9
The dominant normative account of trade law and policy is
utilitarian in nature." Utilitarianism is a particular form of
consequentialism, which in its classical form determines the
morality of an act according to its consequences for the aggre-
gate of individual utility.6' Forms of utilitarian ethics can be
distinguished according to whether they focus on the justifica-
tion of acts, which is classical or act-utilitarianism,6 2 or the
justification of rules which in turn justify or constrain acts,
tion. See id. at 687.
56. As Hausman and McPherson put it, "[tihe standard definition of a social
optimum compares social alternatives exclusively in terms of the goodness of their
outcomes (rather than the rightness of their procedures), and identifies the good-
ness of outcomes with satisfaction of individual preferences." Id. In defining posi-
tive outcomes with individual preferences, it is therefore also liberal, and not
communitarian. Id. at 675.
57. For a good introduction to consequentialism in general, see G.E.M.
Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1 (1958); Germain Grisez, Against
Consequentialism, 23 AM. J. JURIS. 21 (1978).
58. See ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MoRALITY 52 (1977).
59. For example, welfarist moral theories take the view that consequences for
aggregate individual well-being matter, with other notions such as rights or vir-
tues serving as means to promoting welfare. See Hausman & McPherson, supra
note 6, at 704. Egoism is a form of consequentialism, focusing on the outcome for
the individual decision-maker. See R.G. Frey, Introduction: Utilitarianism and
Persons, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS 3, 5 (R.G. Frey ed., 1984).
60. See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 36 (1996) (economic foundation
of trade law furnishes utilitarian justifications for free trade regime); McGee, supra
note 25, at 549 ("vast majority" of trade scholarship analyzes trade from a utilitar-
ian perspective).
61. Put in economic terms, utilitarianism takes morality as the maximizing of
some function of the welfare of individual members of society. See Hausman &
McPherson, supra note 6, at 689.
62. Act utilitarianism is the classical utilitarianism of Bentham and Mills. See
sources cited infra note 65.
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which is rule-utilitarianism.' For the purposes of this article,
both forms shall be taken together, and generally referred to
as utilitarianism.' Utilitarianisms can also be distinguished
on the basis of their particular theory of value, or utility. His-
torically, utility was defined in hedonic terms involving indi-
vidual pleasure.6 5 Modern utilitarianism and the economists
who deploy it are more likely to define utility in terms of pref-
erence satisfaction, 6  or more generally as a form of
welfarism, in which the sum or average of resulting individual
welfare levels determines the correctness of an act, principle or
policy.6
7
Thus from a normative perspective, the Efficiency Model of
trade law asserts, explicitly or implicitly, the utilitarian argu-
ment that free trade is good because of its consequences, name-
ly the maximization of aggregate individual welfare from effi-
63. Under rule utilitarianism, a particular rule is justified along utilitarian
lines, which rule must then be followed with regard to individual acts without
undertaking a further utilitarian calculation for each act, unless and until the
utilitarian calculus underlying the rule itself changes. See DONAGAN, supra note
58, at 193, 196-99.
64. While an oversimplification for many purposes, such treatment is defen-
sible with regard to the subject of this article, which focuses on the effects of
either utilitarianism's inherent consequentialism for human rights. See Frey, supra
note 59, at 5 and infra note 96-97 and accompanying text.
65. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legisla-
tion, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 791, 792 (Edwin A.
Burtt ed., 1967) ("By the principle of utility is meant that principle which ap-
proves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which
it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose inter-
est is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or op-
pose that happiness."); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 10 (Oskar Piest ed.,
1957) ("The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals 'utility' or the 'great-
est happiness principle' holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By
happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and
the privation of pleasure.").
66. See Frey, supra note 59, at 5 ("In recent years, however, numerous writ-
ers have moved away from a mental-state view of utility and value, on the ground
that it is too confining to restrict utility to a concern with states of mind, to an
interest-satisfaction view, in which 'interests' is a generic term covering a multi-
plicity of desires or preferences. Thus, construed as I have done here, preference-
utilitarianism is classical utilitarianism with an expanded value theory.");
Hausman & McPherson, supra note 6, at 705 ("[No prominent theorist now de-
fends a hedonistic conception of utility. All of the other specifically utilitarian
theorists . . . join economists in taking utility not as an object of reference, but as
an index of preference satisfaction.").
67. See Hausman & McPherson, supra note 6, at 704.
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ciency gains and the operation of comparative advantage.68
Trade maximizes welfare for many reasons, including lower
prices, increased consumer choice, increased employment, en-
hanced economies of scale, specialization, increased competi-
tion and the accelerated diffusion of the fruits of innovation. 9
In the case of conflicts between trade-liberalizing rules and
trade-restrictive measures advocated on non-trade grounds,
one will find arguments in favor of free trade expressed in
utilitarian consequentialist terms. For example, embargoes
based on moral or national security grounds may be attacked
on the utilitarian ground that it may be in a nation's best
interest to trade with its enemies, because doing so will have
more good effects than bad in the economic sense." Trade
restrictions justified on environmental grounds may encounter
arguments in favor of a utilitarian evaluation of their merits,
leading to a preference for market-oriented compromises with
trade values.7 In each case, the relative trade costs and regu-
latory benefits of a particular law or policy are weighed, and
the best policy is determined to be that which, on balance, has
the least trade cost or promises the greatest trade benefit.
2. The Normative Underpinnings of Human Rights Law
In contrast, human righs law is built on a fundamentally
different approach to human nature and moral reasoning,
which puts it in tension with the normative underpinnings of
trade law. The human rights movement has undertaken to
establish through human rights law a different aspect of a just
global order than that undertaken in trade law, namely the
protection of human dignity."
The dominant contemporary discipline for the critical anal-
ysis and justification of human rights law is moral and politi-
cal philosophy. While human rights in positive law can be
68. See supra notes 45-46 and works cited therein.
69. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 46, at 10-13; McGee, supra note 25, at 552-
54.
70. See McGee, supra note 25.
71. Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons From
the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1329, 1332, 1371 (1992).
72. "Human rights represent a social choice of a particular moral vision of
human potentiality, which rests on a particular substantive account of the mini-
mum requirements of a life of dignity." DONNELLY, supra note 6, at 17.
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derived from and justified by a variety of theological and philo-
sophical moral theories of human nature,73 at the core of the
concept of human rights is the notion of a transcendental stan-
dard of justice by which particular acts of the state can be
judged.74 The dominant contemporary normative justification
of human rights law is some variety of Western liberalism.75
International human rights law is essentially rooted in the lib-
eral commitment to the equal moral worth of each individual,
regardless of their utility," and human rights themselves em-
body the minimum standards of treatment necessary in view of
this equal moral worth. Moreover, human rights, the very con-
cept of a right, and the closely associated natural rights tradi-
tion,77 are all linked to a particular strand of liberalism, the
73. Traditionally, there have been three approaches to establishing the exis-
tence and basis of human rights: they can be derived from God; they can be
grounded in human nature and what is necessary for human beings to attain their
natural end through perfection of their nature; and they can be argued to be self-
evident, i.e., they can be discerned through reflection on the nature of human be-
ings and the concept of a moral right. The latter, the so-called natural rights
approach, has emerged as the most promising and widely-accepted rationale of the
three, and is the rationale attributed to the UN Declaration of Human Rights and
credited with their widespread acceptance. See H.J. McCloskey, Respect for Human
Moral Rights Versus Maximizing Good, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS 121, 126 (R.G. Frey
ed., 1984).
74. Gordon, supra note 1, at 694.
75. Despite this foundation, human rights advocates generally claim some form
of universalism for human rights. Henkin and others claim a form of positivist
universalism on the grounds that human rights instruments have been ratified by
the vast majority of the states of the world. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF
RIGHTS ix (1990); Pieter van Dijk, A Common Standard of Achievement: About
Universal Validity and Uniform Interpretation of International Human Rights
Norms, 2 NETH. HUIM. RTS. Q. 105, 109-10 (1995). Others claim a normative uni-
versalism for some or all human rights, either on philosophical or empirical
grounds. See Fernando Tes6n, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativ-
ism, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 869, 873 (1985) (arguing that the liberal theory of justice
underlying human rights is demonstrably correct across cultural lines); Christopher
C. Joyner & John C. Dettling, Bridging the Cultural Chasm: Cultural Relativism
and the Future of International Law, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 275, 297 (1990) (posit-
ing that universalism is assertable where it can be empirically shown that cultural
practice does not in fact vary with respect to a given principle, such as the prohi-
bition against arbitrary killing and violence).
76. DONNELLY, supra note 6, at 68 (following Dworkin).
77. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 198 (1980) ("Almost
everything in this book is about human rights ('human rights' being a contempo-
rary idiom for 'natural rights': I use the terms* synonymously)."); but see S.
Prakash Sinha, Freeing Human Rights From Natural Rights, 70 ARCHIV FOR
RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 342, 343 (1984) (disputing necessity or adequacy
of natural rights as basis for human rights).
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non-utilitarian liberalism78 of Locke79 and Kant," which
provides the normative basis for the rights set out in the vari-
ous UN instruments.8
This model inevitably affects the human rights approach
to human nature and moral decision-making, and distinguishes
it from a utilitarian economic approach. The Homo Economicus
Model of human beings presupposed in trade law places little
emphasis on the precise end of human activity, assuming it to
be individual well-being through the satisfaction of individual-
ly determined preferences." In contrast, the Human Rights
Model of human nature is obsessed with ends, in particular
with the status of the human person as an end in them-
selves." What is central about human beings is not their abil-
ity or tendency to rationally maximize their self-interest, but
their intrinsic human dignity and worth. Human dignity and
worth are not matters of individual preference or utility, but
matters of moral duty and principle.' The normative argu-
ments advanced for the protection of human rights are
deontological in nature, in that they focus on principles about
78. Millsian utilitarianism, though it is a liberal theory, is a problematic theo-
ry for human rights because it is consequentialist in nature. While such a theory
can illuminate the moral importance of the consequences of an act for human
dignity, the theory is an inadequate justification for human rights in that it coun-
tenances consequential approaches to rights questions themselves. See infra notes
94-104 and accompanying text.
79. For an overview of Locke's contribution and the Enlightenment roots of
contemporary international human rights law generally, see Gordon, supra note 1,
at 711-20.
80. On the Kantian basis for international human rights, see Fernando Tes6n,
The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 60-70 (1992).
81. McCloskey, supra note 73, at 121.
82. Instead, the inquiry concerning homo economicus focuses on the range of
means available towards attainment of this end, and the effects of particular
choices on the conditions for the satisfaction of preferences.
83. See Tes6n, supra note 80, at 64 (observing that the Kantian view of inter-
national law is based on our duty to treat human beings as ends in themselves,
which requires that the state incorporate respect for human rights); Baxi, supra
note 27, at 166 (stating that "it]he diverse bodies of human rights found their
highest summation with the Declaration on the Right to Development, insisting
that the individual is a subject of development, not its object.") (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added).
84. Frey notes that while the preservation of human life can be advocated on
utilitarian grounds, there is no absolute bar to a change in circumstances such
that killing could subsequently be justifiable on the same utilitarian calculus, thus
demonstrating the unfitness of utilitarian theory as a grounds for human worth
and dignity. See Frey, supra note 59, at 8-9.
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how people are and are not to be treated, regardless of the
consequences.85 Deontological moral reasoning determines the
rightness or wrongness of an act by the nature of the act itself,
specifically whether it is in accord with or violation of certain
moral principles, and regardless of the personally favorable or
unfavorable consequences of the act itself. Rights are things
that are valued chiefly in themselves, and not for their conse-
quences.86 For example, the widely-recognized international
prohibition against torture 7 is justified on the ground that
torture is wrong as a direct violation of human dignity, despite
its utility, despite the fact that it might lead to information of
value to the state, or deter conduct which threatens the
state.8 This is in direct contrast to the consequential form of
moral reasoning which predominates in trade and in economics
generally, and which at least in theory could determine tor-
ture, slavery and other human rights violations to be economi-
cally advantageous or justifiable, and hence appropriate.
The deontological nature of human rights principles also
has important implications for situations in which different
competing claims or values are at stake. Human dignity and
moral worth, which are at the core of human rights, are ex-
pressed in absolute terms: human beings have a dignity and
worth which are not subject to compromise on the basis of
consequential- justifications. Human rights claims "ordinarily
85. See Tes6n, supra note 80, at 71 ("Kant's international ethics follow from
the categorical imperative. Just as individuals may not use human beings as mere
means to an end, so foreigners, and specially foreign governments, may not use
the persons that form another state . . ").
The deontological approach is reflected in the nature of human rights them-
selves, and in the language of human rights instruments. For example, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights states these rights are based on the "inher-
ent" dignity of the human person. See UDHR, supra note 2. Our constitutional
tradition also echoes the sense that these rights are inalienable, that is, they
cannot be separated from the human person. Regarding the U.S. approach to hu-
man rights as constitutional rights, see HENKIN, supra note 75, at 83-108.
86. Hausman & McPherson, supra note 6, at 694.
87. See UDHR, supra note 2, art. 5; Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M.
1027 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture];
Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (torture prohibited by
"law of nations").
88. Convention Against Torture, supra note 87, art. 2.2 ("No exceptional cir-
cumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal po-
litical instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification
of torture.") (emphasis added).
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trump utility, social policy, and other moral or political
grounds for action." 9 A human rights-based claim should
therefore take priority over counterclaims based in utility, and
other consequentialist appeals.9' Where human rights claims
are in conflict with other sorts of claims, human rights theory
dictates that human rights claims receive a very high, if not
trumping, value in such processes.
3. International Economic Law and Human Rights:
Normative Approaches in Conflict
What we find, then, when we examine international eco-
nomic law and international human rights law, are two at-
tempts to identify and implement the obligations which a
broadly liberal theory of justice place on us in international
relationships. We find the international economic law system
attempting to establish a liberal view of the Right Order with
regard to economic well-being, along utilitarian lines. We find
the international human rights system attempting to establish
a liberal view of the Right Order with regard to human dignity
and worth, along deontological lines. And we find that, due to
two salient facts of contemporary international life, namely
globalization and a defective international governance system,
these two powerful mechanisms for global justice are brought
into conflict.
At the practical level, the conflict between trade law and
human rights law is not, at first glance, an obvious one. Short
of a trade treaty providing directly for trade in the products of
prison or slave labor,9 it is hard to imagine a direct conflict
between trade law and core human rights, for example rights
involving life, liberty and the security of one's person.2 If one
89. DONNELLY, supra note 6, at 10 (citing Dworkin TRS 90).
90. As Donnelly puts it, "[a]s the highest moral rights, [human rights] regu-
late the fundamental structures and practices of political life, and in ordinary
circumstances they take priority over other moral, legal and political claims." Id.
at 1.
91. Unfortunately, history reveals that such international economic arrange-
ments are quite possible, and theory suggests they are fully justifiable on an Effi-
ciency Model of trade, however reprehensible they are on other terms. See Nichols,
supra note 11, at 703 (referring to trade in human beings).
92. In fact, the GATT contains a provision explicitly permitting bans on trade
in the products of prison labor, thus arguably reducing an incentive for the exploi-
tation of prisoners. See infra notes 116, 118 and accompanying text. Of course,
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considers human rights more broadly to include property rights
and the rule of law,93 it would appear that in many cases
trade law is in fact working in favor of human rights, as for
example when investment and intellectual property protection
and increased transparency are negotiated as part of a trade
agreement.
Rather, one is more likely to encounter a conflict between
international trade law and measures taken at the national
level to protect human rights, usually by imposing some form
of economic sanction on a state engaged in rights-violating
practices. When instituted between parties to a trade-liberaliz-
ing treaty such as the GATT, such measures are likely to be
challenged as unlawful trade restrictions. Given the ascendan-
cy of international economic law and its institutions, this chal-
lenge is most likely going to be brought in a trade forum, such
as the WTO dispute settlement process. This interaction be-
tween regulatory globalization and the normative conflict out-
lined above therefore results in the prospect of a
deontologically justified human rights law being challenged in,
and perhaps declared invalid by, utilitarian-oriented interna-
tional trade institutions.
At the meta-ethical level, there is reason for concern that
in the contest suggested above, it is the human rights law
which will lose. The deontological morality underlying human
rights law has traditionally been recognized as difficult to
reconcile with the utilitarian and other consequentialist forms
of moral reasoning predominating in trade law.94 The
deontological nature of human rights render it difficult for
human rights law to operate successfully within a system like
the trade law system that is consequentialist in nature, be-
cause in the hypothetical conflict identified above, the trade
institution will follow a normative approach committed to the
possibility of sacrificing human rights protection on the basis
here there is a strong economic rationale as well, in that it is difficult for firms
employing free, compensated labor to compete with the products of unpaid prison-
ers.
93. See UDHR, supra note 2, arts. 6-8, 17.
94. See Frey, supra note 59, at 10 (stating that "[classical utilitarianism] is,
without refinement, inimical to some claim that there are incommensurable values
(such as human life)"). While preference-satisfaction utilitarianism ameliorates
some of the unpleasant effects of classical utilitarianism, it is subject to the same
basic criticisms. Id. at 13.
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of the human rights measure's adverse effects on trade. Utili-
tarian theory in fact presupposes that determinations of human
worth will involve the trading-off of one life against another."
To a pure act-utilitarian, the fact that a particular trade policy
or trade decision violates or undercuts the effectiveness of a
human right is of no consequence in itself,96 and rule-utili-
tarianism is not an improvement in this respect.97 Even if
human rights are justified on rule-utilitarian grounds as useful
for increasing utility, there is always the possibility that hu-
man rights as a utilitarian-based set of rules will be cast off if
the utility calculus changes." This must be so because utili-
tarianism is committed to denying the possibility of natural
human rights, which people hold simply by virtue of their
status as persons.99
In contrast, human rights law resists such tradeoffs, be-
cause the concept of a right functions to privilege certain
claims against other competing claims, claims which in other
contexts might overcome rights claims. It is in fact a distinc-
tive feature of a right that it can be pressed this way.'° Hu-
man rights by their very nature and justification are not sub-
ject to compromise in the pursuit of good consequences, and it
is precisely such compromises that international economic law
excels in. For this reason,' a utilitarian approach to trade
95. Id. at 8.
96. Rights violations are of no concern to a pure act utilitarian. Id. at 11.
97. Though consequentialist arguments can be framed for rights, such as rule-
utilitarian arguments, there remains a core content to rights that is not exhausted
by their usefulness. See Hausman & McPherson, supra note 6, at 695-96. More-
over, the criticisms which apply in this regard to act utilitarianism also apply to
more sophisticated forms of rule-utilitarianism. See McCloskey, supra note 73, at
124; Frey, supra note 59, at 4.
98. Frey, supra note 59, at 11 ("[Flar from providing a persuasive case over
the wrongness of killing, classical utilitarianism . . . seems perpetually to place
persons and their vital interests at risk, a risk that will be realized if the contin-
gencies fall out one way rather than another."); see also McCloskey, supra note 73,
at 124 (incorporation of a rights-principle into a rule-utilitarian system, while
normatively more attractive, does not insulate it from criticism). There is reason to
fear that the human rights principle reaches that cast-off point precisely when
enforcement would interfere with the powerful economic benefits at stake in trade
decisions, when human rights are at their most vulnerable.
99. McCloskey, supra note 73, at 121.
100. DONNELLY, supra note 6, at 11-12.
101. Other critiques include the concern that utility theory is inadequate to
measure gains and losses. See McGee, supra note 25, at 555, as well as the liber-
tarian argument that there is no public interest or public good, only individuals.
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cannot adequately incorporate human rights concerns based on
deontologically justified rights. °2 Consequentialist, trade-off
based approaches to the evaluation of trade and human rights
conflicts are, in their very method of analysis, biased against
human rights and place human rights at risk, in the fact that
they are unwilling to accord human rights claims the sort of
privilege which human rights advocates consider essential.0 3
Hausman and McPherson point out that strictly deontological
approaches to rights are disturbing to contemporary econo-
mists,'" precisely because such approaches view rights as
absolutely not to be violated, essentially foreclosing the sort of
analysis which economists engage in when evaluating a policy
or course of conduct. Yet this absolute quality which econo-
mists find disturbing about rights, is the absolute quality
which human rights advocates find essential in the human
rights principle.
C. Trade-based Decisions on Trade /Human Rights Conflicts:
Doctrinal Approaches to Normative Conflicts
The theoretical risk posed to human rights law from the
differing approaches to moral decision-making adopted by
trade law and human rights law is borne out at the doctrinal
level when one examines the approach the WTO dispute settle-
Id. at 559.
102. See Frey, supra note 59, at 11.
Since utilitarian reasoning can justify trade-offs . . . whenever contingen-
cies so dictate, and since there are no person-relative principles that bar
utilitarian sacrifice of persons and their vital interests within the uncon-
strained theory, there seems no way to deflect the risk to persons. And
constraints that might deflect the risk, for example, that a life is of in-
herent worth irrespective of its pleasure or capacity for pleasure, that life
is an incommensurable value and so beyond the compass of utilitarian
trade-offs, that this or that person-relative principle could secure persons
and their vital interests from such trade-offs, do not obviously form part
of the classical theory.
Id. (emphasis added). The same basic criticism holds true for preference-satisfac-
tion forms of utilitarianism. Id. at 15.
103. Id. at 17 (questioning whether any consequential theory can adequately ac-
count for the wrongness of fundamental rights violations such as killing).
104. Historically, arguments for capitalism were often rights-based, in that they
lauded capitalism less for its efficiency-enhancing capability than for the protection
of individual freedom offered by the separation of economic and political power.
See Hausman & McPherson, supra note 6, at 693. However, with respect to mod-
em economics, rights-oriented moral theories are more difficult to link to tradi-
tional forms of economic analysis. Id. at 672.
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ment system would actually take to conflicts involving trade
and non-trade values, including trade-human rights conflicts.
Returning to the example first posed above of domestic trade-
restrictive measures adopted at the national level against an
egregious rights-violating state, this Article now assumes that
such a measure has in fact been enacted. Examples of such
measures might include a national-level decision to suspend
GATT-obligated MFN treatment as a response to particular
human rights violations," 5 the imposition by a sub-federal
unit of a government procurement ban as a response to human
rights violations," 6 or the imposition of a trade ban on the
products of indentured child labor, either unilaterally. 7 or
perhaps in response to a future ILO convention prohibiting
such practices.' The common denominator here is state ac-
tion imposing a trade sanction on human rights violators, as a
mechanism to both punish the state and to encourage compli-
ance with international human rights law.
105. For example, the much-debated Helms-Burton legislation, Title I of which
is aimed at trade in goods. For a recent overview of the arguments concerning the
legality of the Helms-Burton legislation under WTO law, including citations to the
extensive literature on the matter, see John A. Spanogle, Jr., Can Helms-Burton
Be Challenged Under WTO?, 27 STETSON L. REv. 1313, 1313 & n.1 (1998). For a
review of the history of U.S. sanctions against Cuba, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, 90 AM. J. INTL L.
419 (1996). For an interesting analysis of the Helms-Burton legislation and its
furor from an international relations perspective, see David P. Fidler, LIBERTAD
v. Liberalism: An Analysis of the Helms-Burton Act from Within Liberal Interna-
tional Relations Theory, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 297 (1997).
106. The Massachusetts government procurement statute sanctioning Myanmar
(formerly Burma) was recently declared unconstitutional as an impermissible in-
fringement on the federal government's power to regulate foreign affairs. See Na-
tional Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17789 (D. Mass. 1998). Massachusetts plans a similar law against Indonesia. See
David R. Schmahmann et al., Off the Precipice: Massachusetts Expands Its Foreign
Policy Expedition from Burma to Indonesia, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 1021
(1997). On the matter of federal and sub-federal relations in trade law generally,
see Matthew Schaefer, Searching for Pareto Gains in the Relationship Between
Free Trade and Federalism: Revisiting the NAFTA, Eyeing the FTAA, 23 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 441 (1997).
107. The United States enacted such a ban in 1997, forbidding the importation
of products "mined, produced or manufactured by forced or indentured child labor."
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998, §
634, Pub. L. No. 105-61, 111 Stat. 1272, 1316 (1997).
108. The United States, among others, has been calling for such a convention.
See President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 19,
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1. Human Rights Trade Sanctions in the WTO
In any of these cases, the target state would challenge
such actions in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding, assum-
ing all states-parties are WTO Member States. The most likely
basis for such a challenge would be that the measure violates
the most-favored-nation and national treatment rules con-
tained in GATT Articles I and III. The challenged measure
would be determined a prima facia Article I violation, because
the like products from other WTO Member States which are
not targets are not subject to the trade restriction."9 The
measure is also likely to be determined a prima facia Article
Ill violation, because like domestic products are also not sub-
ject to the same trade restriction."0 Therefore, the sanction-
ing state is going to have to find a GATT-authorized exception
applicable in such cases, or face a judgement that the measure
nullifies or impairs the target state's expected trade benefits,
and the likelihood of being itself subject to WTO-authorized
sanctions if it fails to amend or withdraw the measure.
As the GATT treaty stands today, there is no single clearly
applicable exception for such a human rights-oriented mea-
sure. There are, however, several exceptions which might ap-
ply if interpreted with human rights concerns in mind. One
possible avenue is that the sanctioning state would seek the
shelter of the national security exception in Article XXI. Article
XXI permits states to unilaterally enact trade-restrictive mea-
sures when the state judges such measures to be "necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests" during a time
of "emergency in international relations.""' However, this is
a controversial provision much disliked and distrusted by the
majority of WTO Member States, in that it is not justiciable as
it has been interpreted."' Therefore, states would be reluc-
109. See Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 379, 437 &
nn.333-35, panel proceedings cited therein and accompanying text (discussing elab-
oration and application of most-favored-nation test).
110. See id. at 436 nn.327, 332, the panel proceedings cited therein and accom-
panying text (discussing elaboration and application of national treatment test). In
certain cases, the product may be so closely linked to the human rights violation
that the same products are prohibited domestically. This may be the case, for
example, with trade involving body parts or organs of prisoners. In such cases,
there may be no underlying national treatment violation.
111. See GATT, supra note 31, art. XXI(b)(iii).
112. See Raj K. Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade Law, 31
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tant to invoke this provision absent at least a plausible nation-
al security risk, and the WTO would be very likely to oppose
any effort to read that exception broadly enough to include
general human rights-based trade sanctions.
A more likely candidate is Article XX, whose exceptions
are intended to permit GATT violations, including Articles I
and III violations, in pursuit of several categories of non-trade
policy goals."' Three Article XX exceptions in particular, the
public morals, human life and health, and prison labor excep-
tions, may be relevant in connection with human rights mea-
sures. Article XX(a) permits measures "necessary to protect
human morals."" Article XX(b) permits measures "necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health.""5 Finally,
Article XX(e) permits measures "relating to the products of
prison labour.""6
The availability of these exceptions turns on two sorts of
interpretive problems. First, each presents at the outset a
similar textual issue, namely whether the scope of the exemp-
tion can be interpreted to accommodate human rights-based
measures." 7 The prison labor exception is least likely to
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 6-20 (1997) (critically assessing Article XXI); Spanogle, su-
pra note 105, at 1328-35 (reviewing problems raised by invoking Article XXI ex-
ception).
113. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the availability of any of
the Article XX exceptions is limited by the chapeau test prohibiting that measures
otherwise justifiable under that article be applied so as to be "a means of arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination . . . or a disguised restriction on international
trade." GATT, supra note 31, art. XX; Shrimp Case, supra note 41 (interpreting
and applying the chapeau test).
114. GATT, supra, note 31, art. XX(a) (emphasis added) (highlighting the "ne-
cessity" test). See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text. See generally Steve
Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INTL L. 689 (1998)
[hereinafter Charnovitz, Moral Exception] (discussing the legislative history and
policy issues of this provision).
115. GATT, supra note 31, art. XX(b) (emphasis added) (highlighting the "ne-
cessity" test); infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text. Much has been written
about the Article XX(b) exception in connection with trade/environment linkage
problems. See, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATr (1994); Steve Charnovitz,
Free Trade, Fair Trade Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
459 (1994) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Green Trade] (reviewing the history of trade
and environmental issues).
116. GATT, supra note 31, art. XX(e). See Christopher S. Armstrong, American
Import Controls and Morality in International Trade: An Analysis of Section 307 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, 8 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 19 (1975) (reviewing legislative
history and policy issues relating to this exception).
117. In approaching an issue of textual interpretation, the WTO Appellate Body
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serve in this case, despite the fact that arguably it is the clear-
est case of a human rights exception in the GATT, for the very
reason that it is so clearly drafted to refer to a single category
of products, namely those produced by prison labor.118 The
public morality exception should apply in at least a subset of
human rights-related claims,' but its broader applicability
turns on whether the provision can be interpreted to encom-
pass a wide range of human rights concerns beyond traditional
"public morals" issues.'20 Finally, interpreting Article XX(b)
to include human rights violations as threats to "human...
life or health," would run counter to existing, albeit limited,
GATT jurisprudence on this issue.'2 ' Second, availability of
both the public morals and human life and health exceptions
depends upon whether Articles XX(a) and XX(b) would be in-
will follow the "customary rules of interpretation of public international law," DSU,
supra note 10, art. 3.2, which the Appellate Body has determined are set out in
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1988);
World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report on United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, available in 1996 WL
227476; World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report on Japan-Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, available in 1996 WL 738800. This strategy
promises to improve upon the uneven pattern of interpretive approaches taken by
GATT panels historically. See Nichols, supra note 11, at 422-30 (reviewing panel
approaches). However, the Appellate Body has itself been criticized for its uneven
application of this approach. See Rambod Behboodi, Legal Reasoning and the Inter-
national Law of Trade: The First Steps of the Appellate Body of the WTO, 32 J.
WORLD TRADE 55, 77-78, 92 (1998).
118. GATT, supra note 31, art. XX(e); but see Stirling, supra note 29, at 33-39
(arguing it would be a "logical extension" of Article XX(e) to apply it to a broad
range of human rights violations).
119. See Charnovitz, Moral Exception, supra note 114, at 729-30 (suggesting
claims involving slavery, trade in weapons, narcotics, liquor and pornographic
materials, religion, and compulsory labor).
120. Id. at 742-43 (suggesting that international human rights law be used to
interpret the vague scope of the exception).
121. This author is not aware of any GATT panel in which the issue is directly
raised. However, the approach taken by the panel in the Thai Cigarettes case, for
example, would suggest that the provision only exempts measures aimed at prod-
ucts which themselves pose a threat to human life or health, such as cigarettes.
Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7,
1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991) [hereinafter Thai Cigarettes case].
This is consistent with the approach taken by the first Tuna panel regarding the
"process/product" distinction in Article III violations, in which a measure aimed at
the process by which a product was made would not be eligible for consideration
under more favorable GATT provisions involving measures aimed at the product
itself. GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna I].
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terpreted as available for "outward-oriented" measures de-
signed to influence the human rights policies of another juris-
diction,122 which existing GATT jurisprudence calls into ques-
tion. 2 3
If none of these exceptions are available on scope or
territoriality grounds, then the hypothetical human rights
measure proposed above would be ruled a GATT violation. If,
however, these scope issues could be resolved so as to bring
human rights-based domestic measures within the ambit of
either Article XX (a) or (b), then adjudication of the GATT
claim would ultimately rest on the application of the "necessi-
ty" test required by the language of both articles." As the
test is applied, the WTO panel would rule that the disputed
measure was not in fact necessary, and therefore a GATT
violation, if it were to find that another less trade-restrictive
measure was "reasonably available."
In conditioning the availability of these Article XX excep-
tions, and therefore any human rights-favorable resolution of
this conflict, on the necessity test, the WTO is applying what
has been called a trade-off device, a term encompassing vari-
ous legal techniques used in trade institutions to relate the
trade burden of a given measure against its intended non-trade
regulatory benefit.'26 It is in the utilization of trade-off devic-
122. The exception for the products of prison labor does not raise this issue, as
by its terms it is drafted to permit importing states to take into account the pris-
on labor practices of other jurisdictions in deciding whether to permit or block the
importation of certain products. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839, 1 5.16 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna
III.
123. See Charnovitz, Green Trade, supra note 115, at 718-24 (discussing the
distinction between "inward" and "outward" oriented measures, and disfavor to-
wards outward-oriented measures expressed in the Tuna cases).
124. See supra notes 114, 115 and accompanying text. The exception for the
products of prison labor does not impose a "necessity" test, requiring merely that
the measure in question be one "relating to the products of prison labour," thereby
incorporating the more lenient "rationality" test. See infra notes 161-62 and accom-
panying text.
125. See Thai Cigarettes case, supra note 121, 75 (stating that the measure
is not "necessary" if there exists a less trade-restrictive alternative a state could
"reasonably be expected to employ" in pursuit of its non-trade objectives); Tuna I,
supra note 121, 5.18; Tuna II, supra note 122, 3.72.
126. Joel Trachtman, in his pioneering study of trade-off devices, identifies as
potential trade-off devices national treatment rules, simple means-end rationality
tests, necessity/least trade restrictive alternative tests, proportionality, balancing,
and cost-benefit analysis. Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and . . . Problems, Cost-Benefit
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es, and in the choice and application of a particular device,
that the WTO dispute resolution system embodies the utilitari-
an approach to normative conflicts in trade, and in so doing
raises issues about its compatibility with human rights law.
2. Trade-off Mechanisms in Trade Linkage Disputes
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that trade-off
devices have as a defining feature the willingness to juxtapose,
and in many cases to commensurate between, trade values on
the one hand and non-trade values on the other. Such an ap-
proach is consistent with the consequentialist approach taken
by most economists and economically-minded analysts to trade
matters.2 ' It has in fact been said that utilitarianism is pre-
eminently "a theory about trade-offs."2 ' It should not be sur-
prising to find such a market-oriented measure in a trade-
based dispute settlement mechanism.'29
In contrast, the very notion of trade-off devices runs coun-
ter to the deontological approach to human rights. Normative-
ly, human rights rest on the incommensurability of rights,
which is alien to utilitarian theories."' In human rights
terms, one cannot morally trade a certain amount of human
rights violation in exchange for a greater amount of trade
welfare benefit, even if the latter is seen as enhancing or em-
bodying other human rights. While it is foreseeable that a
trade-based forum may be legally required to engage in some
sort of balancing analysis, weighing the trade costs of protec-
tion against the human rights costs of acquiescence, such an
analysis might be objected to by human rights advocates at the
outset as simply inadequate in view of the absolute moral
obligation to enforce human rights regardless of the conse-
quences.'' On this view, the preeminent mechanism for re-
Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9 EUR. J. INTL L. 32, 32 (1998).
127. Trachtman accepts as a general proposition that trade-offs must be made
between trade values and other social values. Id.; accord Hausman & McPherson,
supra note 6, at 696 (discussing Nozick).
128. Frey, supra note 59, at 16.
129. Indeed, Delbriick notes a preference for market-oriented strategies and
mechanisms for globalization problems, where "the globalization of trade as a
means of maximizing economic welfare for the greatest number constitutes the
policy goal." Delbriick, supra note 4, at 19.
130. Id.
131. See Hausman & McPherson, supra note 6, at 696 (child torture example).
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solving policy disputes in trade institutions by its very nature
defeats the fundamental tenet of human rights law.
In thus failing to distinguish a subset of values the trade-
off of which is not permitted, some may view any trade analy-
sis as already skewed in favor of trade values over human
rights values. However, it may nevertheless be inevitable that
a trade-off type of analysis will be carried out in the event of
regulatory conflicts, at least under the current international
governance regime. Some form of balancing is often involved in
policy formation: one compares two options in terms of their
mutual effects on identified values, and one decides. In partic-
ular, where the dispute is not directly between trade law and
human rights law, but trade law and domestic measures enact-
ed to enforce human rights, it is conceivable that balancing be
used in determining the appropriate or most effective means
towards achieving the human rights goals when there is a
trade cost. Any such approach, however, and in particular the
trade-off device actually employed, must be carefully examined
and carefully utilized in policy decisions where rights are in-
volved, or the very nature and principle of rights can be violat-
ed at the outset. Therefore, it becomes important to evaluate
each trade-off device in terms of the degree to which it discrim-
inates against human rights. Trachtman concludes that from a
trade perspective certain measures are to be preferred over
others, citing in particular the necessity test.'32 It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that from a human rights perspective, a dif-
ferent set of preferences emerges, in fact the opposite one.
3. The WTO Necessity Test as a Trade-off Device
Notwithstanding the argument that some sort of balancing
is required in policy-formulation where competing values are
at stake, the necessity test is clearly objectionable in human-
rights terms as a trade-off device on the ground that it is bi-
ased in favor of trade values. 33 In other words, the test eval-
uates measures favorably precisely insofar as their impact on
trade is the least possible, despite the fact that more trade-
impacting measures might be more effective in realizing the
non-trade value. Not only does this trade-off mechanism fail to
132. Trachtman, supra note 126, at 81-82.
133. See Nichols, supra note 11, at 699-700.
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recognize the high priority which rights must hold in any poli-
cy determination, but in fact the necessity test turns this on its
head, and privileges trade values over all other competing
values."M
To a limited extent the "reasonably available" qualification
invites some consideration of the effectiveness of the disputed
measure in accomplishing its non-trade regulatory purpose,
since any less trade-restrictive measure, which forms the basis
for an invalidation of the chosen measure, must be "reasonably
available" in view of the state's non-trade regulatory objectives.
The extent of such consideration, however, depends entirely on
the interpretation of such language, and the application of the
qualification, by the GATT panel. In particular, the language
clearly does not require specific consideration of the effective-
ness of alternative measures in achieving their non-trade goals,
in the way that similar language in the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement does refer to the level of protection
achievable by the alternative measure. 3 '
Therefore, it would be consistent with the language of the
necessity test as currently interpreted for a GATT panel to find
that a measure significantly less effective in achieving the non-
trade purpose would nonetheless be identified by the panel as
"reasonably available," and therefore serve as the basis for
invalidating the chosen measure. This is disturbing in that,
since such a measure was in fact not chosen by the sanctioning
state, this language would have the effect of substituting the
trade forum's opinion of the rationality of alternatives for the
opinion of the legislating forum.'36 If one considers that do-
134. Thomas J. Schoenbaum has argued that the current GATT/WTO interpre-
tation of the Article XX(b) necessity test turns the provision "on its head" in a lit-
eral sense, in that "necessary" refers syntactically to the need for protection of life
and health, and not to the trade effects of the measure, and is thus wrong on
textual grounds. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the
Environment: the Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INVL L. 268, 276
(1997).
135. "[A) measure is not more trade-restrictive than required unless there is
another measure, reasonably available taking into account technical and economic
feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection
and is significantly less restrictive to trade." Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Dec. 15, 1993, Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 9, art.
5 n.3 (1994) (emphasis added). See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
136. Also, if the test is interpreted, as it has been, to require justification not
of the entire regulatory scheme but of each specific trade restrictive component,
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mestic legislatures may, in principle and at least in certain
cases, produce legislative outcomes "on the merits," then it is
clear that the language of Article XX(a) and (b) invites the
questionable substitution by a panel of trade experts, with a
built-in bias favoring trade values, of a less effective human
rights measure in the place of a more effective, democratically-
selected, human rights measure on the basis of the measure's
effects on trade.'
IV. PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE
GLOBAL MARKET: DOCTRINAL SOLUTIONS FOR NORMATIVE
CONFLICTS
As a matter of justice, our society is committed to both
markets and rights. Therefore, it is inevitable that there will
be conflict between the rationality of markets and the rational-
ity of rights. In many respects, the challenge facing the global
community is akin to the challenge facing any society based on
both markets and rights-how to carve out the respective
spheres for rights and for free market choices, and how to
regulate or limit the range of market choices when they threat-
en fundamental rights. This comes down to institutional deci-
sions, of both a norm-creating and adjudicative nature. In
other words, how do we incorporate both trade values and
human rights values in comprehensive policies respecting both
markets and rights, and what rules do we apply when these
values, and the laws incorporating these values, conflict?. 8
The resolution of globalization/human rights conflicts in a
manner which enhances the effectiveness of human rights law
is going to require a mechanism for the recognition within
then the burden is much more difficult to meet. Trachtman in fact concedes that
the alternative would be much more favorable to non-trade values. Trachtman,
supra note 126, at 69.
137. Accord Schoenbaum, supra note 134, at 277 ("this interpretation of
'necessity' constitutes too great an infringement on the sovereign powers of states
to take decisions (one hopes) by democratic means so as to solve problems and
satisfy their constituents"). Trachtman concedes that in this approach the charac-
terization of the measure to be evaluated introduces "a certain degree of outcome-
determinative discretion." Trachtman, supra note 126, at 69. This discretion is, of
course, in the hands of trade policy experts.
138. The importance of mechanisms to balance the conflicts which can occur
between fundamental normative elements of a globalized liberalism, such as the
conflict between free markets and human rights, is recognized as one of the cen-
tral challenges of globalization. See Seita, supra note 11, at 484-85.
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international economic law of the priority, which at least cer-
tain fundamental human rights must enjoy. In other words,
there must be some mechanism for a constitutional level of
deference within international economic law toward at least
certain elements of the International Bill of Human Rights,
such as the core rights involving life, freedom, security and
bodily integrity, and the recognition within international eco-
nomic law of rights-enforcement techniques such as trade sanc-
tions, which make such rights effective, and which cannot be
balanced or traded off in international economic law dispute
resolution decisions. Where some sort of trade-off is inevitable,
there must be clear recognition of the priority which human
rights claims must have in any value conflict.
A. Pre-empting Conflicts Among Different Sets of Rules
At the global level, resolution of the trade/human rights
conflict is complicated by the defects, from a constitutional
viewpoint, of international governance." 9 It is a fundamental
feature of the landscape of global social policy in the late 20th
century that no one institution has the effective jurisdiction to
create and adjudicate norms in all aspects of global social
concern.' o4 Instead, we find separate treaty regimes and sep-
arate institutions, built and justified according to conflicting
normative principles, yet both ultimately reflecting critical
aspects of a liberal vision for global social life.
As a result, it is likely that norms affecting both human
rights and trade will continue to be negotiated in the context of
a treaty or treaty-making conference predominantly oriented
towards one or the other of these areas of social concern. And
it is likely that disputes involving both human rights and trade
law will, absent modification of the existing governance mecha-
nism, continue to be resolved in dispute resolution fora which
will be constrained by treaty law and institutional paradigm to
give priority to one set of concerns over another. Therefore, a
natural question to consider first would be whether one solu-
139. In fact, national measures are more likely to be used in absence of inter-
national government. See Charnovitz, Social Issues, supra note 48, at 19.
140. For an excellent discussion of the problems which this institutional frag-
mentation creates in the trade/environment area, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institution-
al Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ & Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1043 (1994).
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tion might be some mechanism to either expand the scope of
the WTO to include human rights norms themselves, thus
bridging the regulatory chasm, or concede the institutional
disjunction and limit the jurisdiction of trade institutions over
human rights measures.
1. Include Human Rights Rules in Trade Agreements
It has been suggested that one approach would be the
incorporation of certain human rights norms into the WTO
agreements.' Modifying the WTO to include human rights
concern is of course more attractive than the reverse, namely
adding trade issues to the scope of existing human rights trea-
ties and institutions, since the WTO is the preeminent global
economic institution, with a newly strengthened enforcement
system and immense international prestige. Moreover, the
GATT treaty does recognize to a certain extent certain impor-
tant social policy concerns based in values other than
trade.' This approach would add to that foundation by in-
terpreting Article XX(e) as a broad human rights exception,'
modifying the WTO agreements to add a core list of recognized
human rights,' and creating a specialized human rights
body within the structural framework of the WTO, with au-
thority to hear human rights related complaints and to impose
trade sanctions. 45
This approach has the benefit of reversing the current
trend of institutional specialization which complicates the
trade-human rights and other trade linkage issues. However, it
is precisely for this reason that such an approach is unlikely to
succeed, in that there does not appear to be the requisite de-
gree of political support that such a sweeping overhaul would
require. In fact, the trend seems in the opposite direction, as
the majority of the world's trading nations have decided that
141. See Stirling, supra note 29, at 33.
142. However, the adequacy of the measures adopted can be questioned, as can
the extent to which such concerns are recognized. Moreover, the underlying norma-
tive source of the conflict is not recognized explicitly, principally because the
GATT adopts a trade values-based regulatory system. See Charnovitz, Social Is-
sues, supra note 48, at 23-24.
143. See supra notes 117-19 (discussing the Article XX(e) exception).
144. See Stirling, supra note 29, at 39-40.
145. Id. at 40-45.
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the WTO is not the appropriate institution to articulate human
rights norms, leaving that to other specialized agencies such as
the ILO.'46
2. Limiting Trade Jurisdiction Over Human Rights Measures
Alternatively, the jurisdiction of the WTO could be limited
such that the legitimacy of any human rights-related trade
actions would not be adjudicated in the WTO. 47 The broadest
across-the-board restriction on the WTO's jurisdiction over
human rights measures would be a general exception added to
either the GATT, the WTO Charter or the WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding, excluding national measures taken in
response to violations of treaty-based or customary human
rights from WTO review.148 However, contrary to existing Ar-
ticle XX exceptions, which incorporate some form of trade-off
mechanism presupposing panel review, such an exception
would have to be drafted more along the lines of the national
security exception in Article XXI, vesting in the sanctioning
state some form of unilateral discretion in the face of human
rights violations. Otherwise, human rights-based measures are
not really excluded from WTO review, but privileged according
to some form of trade off mechanism. 49
An alternative approach, more limited in scope, would only
apply to human rights treaties involving products which them-
selves embody or are the fruits of human rights violations,
such as pornography and the products of indentured child
labor; or to any human rights treaties negotiated in the future
to expressly provide for the use of economic sanctions in re-
sponse to, human rights violations. 5 ° In such cases, the WTO
146. See Singapore Declaration, supra note 34.
147. This is the approach Philip Nichols advocates for linkage issues in gener-
al. See Nichols, supra note 11, at 709-12.
148. Cf. Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming U.S. Trade Policy to Protect the Global
Environment: A Multilateral Approach, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 185, 204 (1994)
(arguing that amending GATT to draft new environmental exception is the best
approach to the trade/environment linkage problems).
149. Nichols seems to blur this point, in that the operation of his exemption
would still require an investigation by a dispute settlement panel into the
measure's purpose. Nichols, supra note 11, at 709-12 (positing implementation of
human rights measures through modification or interpretation of the DSU).
150. This might resemble the practice under certain environmental treaties to
provide for trade-restrictive measures to be taken with regard to delineated prod-
ucts which harm the environment. See Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
[Vol. XXV:I
19991 TRADING AWAY HUMAN RIGHTS
should be required to recognize the legitimacy of sanctions
imposed within the constraints of such a treaty, and such mea-
sures should not have to undergo the necessity test as applied
through the Article XX exceptions.' 5' Such recognition could
take the form of a pure hierarchy of norms provision, ensuring
that in the event of a conflict between a trade measure and a
measure taken pursuant to an obligation under such an enu-
merated treaty, the obligations of that treaty should pre-
vail. 1
52
There are several benefits to adopting either of these vari-
ants. First, this approach would represent the decision by the
international community at the political or legislative level5 3
that trade-related human rights measures are appropriate
despite their potentially adverse trade effects. Second, either
amendment eliminates the interpretive problems attendant to
including human rights measures within the scope of existing
exceptions."M Third, in its Article XXI-like form, such an ex-
ception would grant the broadest possible scope for state ac-
tion, including both economic measures taken pursuant to a
Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550, art. 4 (entered into force Jan. 1,
1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, arts. III-V, VIII 12 I.L.M.
1085 (entered into force July 1, 1975) [hereinafter Wild Fauna Convention] (both
providing for the total ban of unlawful trade in covered substances, even with non-
parties to the agreement). Of course, in the case of these treaties, the restrictions
apply to products which themselves produce the harm.
151. The GATT already recognizes this principle in its exception for economic
sanctions implemented in response to a U.N. Security Council Resolution. GATT,
supra note 31, art. XXI(c). Particularly when one considers that such a measure
would still be subject to multilateral review and constraint within its own system,
such an exclusion may not be too broad for advocates of the trade system.
152. The "purity" of this proposed hierarchy of norms lies in the fact that it
does not incorporate a trade-off mechanism requiring panel review, in contrast to
the actual NAFTA hierarchy of norms provision, which in the case of environmen-
tal treaties imposes a necessity test on measures taken pursuant to the listed
treaties. Article 104 of NAFTA states that, where there is an inconsistency be-
tween NAFTA obligations and the obligations imposed by certain listed treaties,
including the Montreal Convention and the Wild Fauna Convention, supra note
150, the obligations under the listed treaties shall prevail to the extent of the
inconsistency, provided that the Party has chosen the least inconsistent means of
complying with the conflicting obligation, where the party in fact has a choice
among "equally effective and reasonably available" means of compliance. North
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
153. On the distinction between legislative and adjudicatory approaches to the
problem, see Nichols, supra note 11, at 691-99.
154. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
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human rights treaty authorizing sanction, and economic mea-
sures taken unilaterally by a state in response to violations of
rights which, while they are the subject of binding internation-
al custom or treaty law, are not expressly contained within in-
struments authorizing economic sanctions. In its narrower,
hierarchy-of-norms form, such an amendment would still grant
a very high level of deference to at least treaty-based human
rights measures.
In granting to human rights measures an automatic exclu-
sion from review according to trade values and trade princi-
ples, such a general exception would be quite congenial to the
philosophic approach of the human rights movement, which
seeks recognition of the priority of human rights claims. 5
However, the very breadth of such an approach, coupled with
its preference for human rights over trade values, would make
such an amendment difficult to enact in the face of concerted
opposition from WTO Member States committed to a higher
priority for trade values. Moreover, an Article XXI approach, or
a pure hierarchy of norms, would be unpopular for its very
nonjusticiability, already a concern with the existing Article
XXI exception. This nonjusticiability would be resisted on for-
mal grounds, in view of the strong preference in the WTO for
rule-based adjudicative dispute resolution, and by Member
States reluctant to open themselves to such broad unreview-
able use of economic sanctions. Finally, such an approach
would raise quite legitimate concerns over the invitation to
protectionist abuse that such a blanket exception would in-
vite. 5
6
155. Moreover, the conflict at the norm-creation stage remains less con-
straining, in that states are free to reach negotiated compromises between differ-
ent sets of values in the creation of a treaty, in a way that treaty-based dispute
settlement mechanisms are not.
156. Such an exception could still be conditioned on the chapeau test for arbi-
trary discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade, and thus would not be a
blanket invitation to protectionist legislation. Adding a chapeau-style test would
change the nature of the exception from a limitation of jurisdiction to an amend-
ment altering the nature of the trade-off device. It may also be possible to deter-
mine a rule or metric for distinguishing "authentic" from "protectionist" invocations
of such a human rights exception, as Jeffrey Atik has proposed regarding linkage
issues generally. See Jeffrey Atik, Identifying Anti-democratic Outcomes, 19 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 229 (1998).
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B. Rights-deferential Trade-off Mechanisms Where Conflicts
Must Arise
Absent the implementation of a preclusionary approach
such as those discussed above, one must then face the existing
problem of how to adjudicate trade disputes involving human
rights, where measures based on the obligations of customary
or treaty-based human rights norms are at issue within trade
fora which are treaty-bound to consider only trade-based fac-
tors. Therefore, the remainder of this section will focus on
ways to avoid or minimize such conflicts as they might arise in
trade dispute settlement fora, attempting to reconcile trade
and human rights claims in a way that more accurately re-
flects the preeminent status which human rights claims must
be afforded in policy disputes.
1. Amending the GATT to Apply a Different Trade-off
Mechanism
To the extent that trade-human rights conflicts are going
to be adjudicated within trade institutions, it becomes critical
to revise the trade-off mechanisms which will be applied in
trade dispute resolution mechanisms to better take into ac-
count human rights law and principles, while permitting the
trade panel to identify and rule against disguised protection-
ism.
a. National Treatment
The principle of national treatment is a basic tradeoff
mechanism employed by most trade agreements, including the
WTO. The national treatment rule is not inherently objection-
able for human rights, since it merely requires a level of con-
sistency between foreign and domestic treatment of goods or
producers with regard to any legislation, including one ad-
dressing human rights violations."5 7 To begin with, in appro-
priate cases national treatment may be the only requirement,
157. Interestingly enough, however, Trachtman characterizes national treatment
as in fact biased in favor of non-trade values and is critical on this basis. See
Trachtman, supra note 126, at 72. However, from the perspective of human rights,
one would expect that any trade-off mechanism employed should be biased in
favor of human rights.
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as in a ban on trade in obscene materials, in which the product
itself embodies the violation. If such products are banned do-
mestically as well, then there is no national treatment viola-
tion, and the inquiry should stop there. However, in the hypo-
thetical case we are considering involving trade sanctions,
national treatment would not be an appropriate mechanism.
The measure in question would almost certainly be a prima
facie violation of the national treatment rule, since the mea-
sure is addressed at a rights-oppressive practice that in many
cases will not even be connected to the process, let alone the
product, targeted by the sanction.'58 For the same reason, do-
mestic products will not be subject to any analogous restric-
tion. In this case, if national treatment alone were the disposi-
tive test, then it would in fact operate as a complete rejection
of non-trade values, contrary to Trachtman. Thus, while a
national treatment test may be friendly or even biased in favor
of non-trade values where an aspect of the product or process
is in question, this rule would not work so favorably towards
non-trade values in a general sanctions situation, which is
likely to be more common.
In such cases, a modified form of national treatment may
be indicated, focusing on the sanctioned conduct and not on the
products which are the targets of the sanctions.'59 In such a
case, one would want to know if the conduct which forms the
basis of the sanction is also prohibited domestically. 6 ' For
sanctions which are applied pursuant to a human rights trea-
ty, or which have been approved by a multilateral human
rights treaty-based organ, this should be enough from a trade
point of view. The legitimacy of the sanction itself, if chal-
lenged, should be challenged in the applicable human rights
158. In the child labor example, however, there is a link between the embar-
goed product and the suspect process. Nevertheless, the product/process distinction,
if carried forward into WTO jurisprudence, would be fatal to measures addressing
human rights violations which arise in the production of certain products. See
Tuna I, supra note 121; Tuna II, supra note 122.
159. The panel report in Tuna I may not be an insurmountable obstacle in this
regard, in that it has been much-criticized and, in any event, was not adopted.
See Tuna I, supra note 121; Charnovitz, Green Trade, supra note 115, at 723.
160. This approach would be consistent with an early draft of the predecessor
to Article XX in the Draft ITO Charter, as noted by the panel in Tuna I: "excep-
tion (b) read: 'For the purpose of protecting human, animal or plant life or health,
if corresponding domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist in the importing
country.'" (emphasis added). Tuna I, supra note 121, T 5.26.
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forum, not the trade forum.
b. Rationality
Assuming human rights can come under Article XX (a) or
(b) or Article XX is amended to create an additional, express
human rights exception, the nature of human rights will re-
quire a more rights-deferential test than the necessity test. In
the case of unilateral sanctions that are not aimed at specific
products tied to the human rights abuse, it may be appropriate
at the trade level to apply a simple rationality test, as a safe-
guard against blatantly protectionist measures."6 ' Thus if
there is a rational, means-end relationship between the sanc-
tion and the targeted conduct, the inquiry should stop
there.'62 A trade sanction imposed against a vital export of
the abusive country, with conditions for its removal clearly tied
to changes in human rights practices, should satisfy such a
test. A trade sanction imposed against a less significant export,
but one which has a powerful domestic producer lobby, or
where the conditions for removal cannot be met or have been
met without the lifting of the sanction, should not meet this
test.
c. Proportionality
It may be that the trade community would consider a mere
rationality test inadequate, because of the omnipresent danger
of disguised discrimination, and would press for a still-more
trade deferential form of trade-off device such as proportionali-
ty. The proportionality test requires that the trade cost be
proportionate with reference to the non-trade benefits.
Trachtman cites this as deferential to a degree to non-trade
values, in that it requires only that the burden be proportion-
ate.6 3 But this test seems quite biased in favor of trade val-
ues, at least in the case of conflicting human rights values, in
that human rights law places a supreme value on human
161. This would be consistent to the approach taken to measures restricting
trade in the products of prison labor, which face only a rationality test.
162. This would bring the language of Article XX(b) into line with the existing
language of Article XX(e), which merely imposes a rationality test. See supra note
124 and accompanying text.
163. Trachtman, supra note 126, at 81.
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rights, which might in fact require a "disproportionate" level of
deference or protection. At least, it could easily appear dispro-
portionate to trade policy experts charged with applying these
rules, particularly given the bias in trade fora against
deontological forms of moral reasoning. The very inalienability
of human rights might suggest a disproportionality to
some.
16
2. Modifying the Necessity Test Through Judicial
Interpretation
For the reasons discussed above, the necessity test as
applied fails to take into account the priority which human
rights-related claims must be accorded, and in fact is biased
against non-trade values including human rights. However, the
political factors attendant to WTO amendment and the strong,
if not overwhelming, pro-trade bias of the institution and its
dominant Member States, may preclude any sort of amend-
ment substituting a potentially more human-rights deferential
trade-off mechanism, leaving the necessity test in place. There-
fore, if some sort of necessity test must perforce be utilized, it
should be modified to grant increased deference to human
rights values.
One approach would be to simply introduce such modifica-
tions into the jurisprudence of Article XX through a decision by
the WTO Appellate Body. This is less formally protective than
an explicit amendment of the language, but is certainly proce-
durally more readily attainable. 65 A logical place to consider
164. Ultimately, such measures would not be ruled disproportionate if the fo-
rum recognizes the priority of human rights to a sufficient degree that the result-
ing trade burden would be considered appropriate. But this depends entirely on
the trade forum's characterization of the importance of the value being protected
by the legislation in conflict. Is it appropriate for democratically-enacted human
rights laws to be subject to this sort of evaluation by an independent body of
trade policy experts? See generally Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International
Trade Decision-making, 27 CORNELL INTL L.J. 699 (1994) (presenting a critique of
the anti-democratic nature of trade institutions).
165. The effectiveness of these approaches would, of course, depend on the
precedential effect of WTO appellate body rulings. To the extent that the emerging
doctrine of stare decisis in WTO decisions continues to evolve, such approaches
may be equally as effective as formal amendments, and more readily attainable.
See Raj KL Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law, 14
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL. (forthcoming 1999); Raj K. Bhala, The Precedent Setters:
De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication, 9 J. TRANSNATL L. & POLY (forth-
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an interpretive amendment would be in the application of the
existing "reasonably available" qualification. The most rights-
protective interpretation would stipulate that, in order for the
existence of a less trade restrictive alternative to invalidate a
human rights measure, it must be shown that the less restric-
tive alternative is equally effective in terms of its impact on the
human rights abuse in question. So interpreted, the WTO
necessity test would resemble the necessity test embodied in
the NAFTA's hierarchy of norms provision.'66
A somewhat less rights-protective approach would be to
interpret the necessity test in Article XX to conform to the
necessity test as established in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement, which requires that a less restrictive measure be
both "significantly" less restrictive, and disqualify the chal-
lenged measure only if it meets the "appropriate" level of pro-
tection."6 7 This is clearly not as strong as the NAFTA test,
since an "appropriate" level may be somewhat less than the
"equally effective" level. However, it is still an improvement
over the necessity test as currently interpreted, and should be
the minimum standard applied to any less effective but more
trade-friendly human rights measure at the panel level, since
to find such a measure reasonably available without any con-
sideration of such effects would be to utterly subvert both the
judgement and the regulatory aim of the state. If coupled with
procedural reforms allowing amicus briefs, panelists with non-
trade expertise, or other forms of participation by the human
rights community,' such an amendment would put non-
trade values more on a par with trade values in any Article XX
(a) or (b)-based proceeding.
V. CONCLUSION
The linkage debates currently underway in trade law and
policy reveal to us that international economic law is fumda-
coming 1999); Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, Precedent in World Trade Law, 64
NETH. INT'L L. REV. 346 (1997).
166. See supra note 152.
167. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
168. See Shrimp Case, supra note 41, 11 89-91; Philip M. Nichols, Extension of
Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U.
PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 295, 328-29 (1996) (arguing that panel composition should be
changed to include appropriate non-trade experts).
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mentally about justice, as are human rights law and other
linkage issues. Therefore, conflicts between the regulatory
infrastructures of globalization and international human rights
must be analyzed and approached as justice questions. In prac-
tice this means paying attention to the decision-making pro-
cess employed in such conflicts, in that it reflects a process of
moral reasoning about issues of justice, and is not simply an
exercise in identifying trade-liberalizing and trade-restrictive
practices.
Ultimately, the effect of globalization on the recognition,
protection and enforcement of human rights is going to depend
on the relationship between international economic law, which
provides the institutional and regulatory framework for global-
ization, and the international law of human rights. The issue
is complicated by the overlapping jurisdiction of both interna-
tional economic law and international human rights law over
the same geographic and social space. Each regulatory system
has been built according to, and operates on, fundamentally
different, even conflicting, normative assumptions. Thus the
institutional mechanisms developed to establish norms and
resolve disputes in the context of overlapping jurisdictions and
conflicting values will in practice determine whether globaliza-
tion proves to be a friend or foe to human rights. From the
above it is evident that absent significant reforms, trade law,
and the forms of economic analysis underlying it, are inade-
quate for the just resolution of conflicts involving human rights
law in a global market, at least if one considers human rights
to hold a privileged position in law and policy. The changes
suggested above, while they undeniably reflect a social decision
in favor of the human rights principle over, or at least on a par
with, conflicting trade interests, are in line with our domestic
stance on such issues. If we have taken a position in our do-
mestic constitutional orders that fundamental rights are not
subject to unfettered balancing and compromise, then there is
no principled reason to reach a different conclusion in the
international arena. Of course, one can still differ as to the
best means towards this end, and consequential forms of anal-
ysis are useful in identifying favorable approaches. However,
the end must be clear, and not open to accommodation.
It has been suggested that, paradoxically, the greater the
potential threat to human beings and their vital interests
posed by utilitarian reasoning, the greater the perceived need
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for rights-based theories. 169 If So, this might lead one to be
optimistic that some version or combination of the reforms
outlined above might be adopted in the next stage of WTO
evolution. Absent such changes, market globalization, in its
institutional and regulatory form as the international economic
law of today, could mean the triumph of utilitarian approaches
to values over deontological ones, and therefore the triumph of
trade over human rights. The trade system as it is now consti-
tuted is normatively incapable of properly evaluating linkage
decisions because its very approach signals a defeat of funda-
mental non-trade values. At a minimum, this means that to
the extent that trade institutions are called upon to resolve
issues involving trade values and other values such as those
underlying human rights law, the utilitarian approach under-
lying trade values will lead to decisions which are fundamen-
tally skewed in favor of trade over other values at stake. This
is not a victory for trade, but a defeat for our efforts to estab-
lish a just global order.
169. Frey, supra note 59, at 18.
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GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
AN ECONOMIC MODEL
Mark A. A. Warner*
I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship of the development of human rights law
and international economic law to globalization is a very im-
portant subject. I would like to begin my comments with my
definition of globalization. We heard about globalization from
Professor Henkin and also from Professor Garcia. My perspec-
tive will focus on the building blocks of globalization, because I
think that will show what globalization is and what it is not,
what it does and what it does not do.
I will also talk about what human rights are. I think we
need to decide first exactly what we mean by human rights
before we discuss the utilitarian calculus and the relationship
between globalization and human rights. Professor Henkin
spoke about important events in the life of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights:' the birth of the Universal Declara-
tion, its marriage certificate, and its significance as a death
certificate for certain legal principles. Despite the birthday
celebration, I intend to criticize the Universal Declaration
today because I do not think it ultimately makes much sense.
In fact, I believe it leaves a lot of uncertainty about what hu-
man rights are.
I also want to focus on a very good economic study done by
Jeffrey Sachs several years ago. The study will allow us to look
at the relationship between human rights, broadly defined, and
globalization and see what we can learn from that examina-
tion. Further, I want to examine these issues critically to see
whether the conflicts are real or imaginary. Finally, I want to
discuss on a practical day-to-day level how we instrumentalize
* Mr. Warner is a legal counsel in the Trade Directorate of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This Commentary is
based on the speech Mr. Warner presented at the Symposium. Mr. Warner spoke
in his personal capacity. None of his remarks are intended to reflect the views of
the OECD or any of its member states.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. I, 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Dec-
laration].
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or operationalize a discussion about human rights in an inter-
national forum.
II. DisCUSSION
Globalization is a very basic phenomenon.2 It is a function
of the simultaneous rise of significant amounts of trade and
significant amounts of investment. Not too long ago, perhaps
ten or twenty years ago, economists thought that investment
and trade were substitutes, but as the multilateral rounds of
trade negotiation have progressed we have found that by re-
ducing barriers to trade, contrary to the prior belief, we have
seen investment rise. It used to be that countries would erect
barriers to trade, tariffs, as a means of attracting foreign in-
vestment. Some countries, for example, Australia and Canada,
had a completely schizophrenic approach. Having erected trade
barriers to encourage investment, these countries would then
set up elaborate investment screening regimes to ensure that
McDonald's franchises or Gap stores were not on every street
corner.3 Notwithstanding such contradictions, globalization is
really about the rise of trade and investment. Investment flows
are pushed through the rise of multinational enterprises.4
The rise of multinational enterprises is key because we
have found that most trade and investment that takes place in
the world takes place within the framework of a multinational
enterprise.' It is called intra-firm trade or intra-industry
trade. Thus, the engine of trade and investment in the world is
really driven by multinational corporations. I happen to think
that this is a good thing.
Why do multinational corporations want to spread all over
the world? Why do they want to respond to tariff barriers go-
2. For a good review of the economic trends that underpin "globalization",
see Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values 30 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 429, 469 (1997).
3. Mark A. A. Warner, A History of United States-Canada Trade and Invest-
ment Relations, in MULTINATIONALS AND CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE 16
(Alan M. Rugman ed., 1990).
4. For a very good summary of the trends and determinants of foreign direct
investment, see UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1998: Trends and Determi-
nants (1998).
5. See generally RICHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS (1982); Alan M. Rugman & Mark A. A. Warner, Strategies for the
Canadian Multinationals, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN CANADA: STRATEGIES FOR
MANAGEMENT 200 (Alan M. Rugman ed., 1989).
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ing down? They want to take advantage of certain production
and distribution efficiencies, by, for example, making a product
in Mexico by bringing a part in from Canada and another part
in from Malaysia. Why do they do this? Just because it is nice
to bring in parts from other parts of the world? No. They do it
so that you and I can walk down the street and buy a cheaper
car. We can talk about other social preferences and we can use
fancy Latin words describing why we do it. But each and every
one of us goes and buys the cheapest car. This pushes the
multinationals' actions, because they are in the business to sell
cars and to make money and to make a profit. We are, each of
us, the agents of globalization because we are the consumers.
When we talk about globalization we cannot forget our role.
Productive efficiency and distributive efficiency are not
merely abstract concepts. These concepts allow us to achieve
increases in global welfare, not just in individual welfare. The
gains from trade (using trade in the broadest sense to include
trade between nations, trade between firms, and trade between
consumers), by having things produced where they can be
produced most cheaply and by allocating them to the people
who want them more, result in an increase in global welfare.
That means there is more money available for us to buy more
things and if we don't want to buy things, then we can buy
leisure, because leisure is also a good. We can choose not to
buy a car, we can choose to spend more time in a cab, or if we
really want to avoid cars, we can choose to give our money to a
charity.
Of course, there are other supportive and mutually rein-
forcing technological developments in transportation and com-
munication that have facilitated the globalization process. The
globalization process is also driven by revolutions; revolutions
in communication and in transportation. The revolution in
transportation makes it possible for people to move the prod-
ucts around the world; the revolution in communication makes
it possible for capital to flow back and forth. As a result, not
only is capital highly mobile today, so too are highly-skilled
labor, and in some places, highly-unskilled labor. Before turn-
ing to defining the scope of human rights, it is worth consider-
ing that there are two relevant forms of increased investment
flows. Investment that is of a long-term nature, or foreign
direct investment, has arguably been spurred by the combina-
tion of the revolution in transportation and the trade liberal-
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ization process discussed above. However, developments in
communications, and the liberalization of certain trade in ser-
vices, arguably has facilitated a significant rise in foreign indi-
rect investment or short-term portfolio capital investment. In
practice, it is not always simple to distinguish between foreign
direct investment and indirect investment in a particular peri-
od. The distinction is, nonetheless, crucial because some of the
recent concerns about the effects of globalization are rooted in
concerns about short-term, highly volatile capital movements.
In considering the linkage between human rights and global-
ization, and potential policy options, it will be important to
bear this distinction in mind. This is globalization. It is not a
monster; it is not something strange; it really is about increas-
ing societal welfare.
What do we mean by human rights? I thought that I
would take the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a
definition of natural rights. We should be looking at the Decla-
ration to try and decipher definitions of human rights because
the Declaration itself is hopelessly incoherent. It is hopelessly
incoherent because it tries to do too many things. Professor
Henkin noted that it merges notions of welfare economics,
rooted in the 1940s economics (I would add, largely discredited
today), with a much older tradition of natural rights. The prob-
lem is that these things don't always fit together very well.
Let's start with natural rights, namely the basic human rights
that one finds in the Universal Declaration, i.e., the right to
life,6 the right against arbitrary arrest,7 and the prohibition of
slavery.8 These rights make sense to me. It gets more compli-
cated, though, when you start to wed these rights to welfare
state rights.
Let's explore some of the more difficult to understand
rights found in the Universal Declaration. First, let's start
with cultural rights, because I live in France, where people
think that culture is important. The right to speak the French
language is important, of course, but it is also important to
line up to watch the latest Madonna movie or to go to a
McDonald's restaurant on the Champs-Elys6es. Article 15 of
6. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3.
7. Id. art. 9.
8. Id. art. 4.
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the Universal Declaration refers to cultural rights,9 but what
does that mean? Does it mean that there should be no
McDohald's restaurants on the Champs-Elys6es? Remember,
the French just stopped a multilateral agreement on invest-
ment, in part, because they thought their cultural sovereignty
was at risk.1° Is that the kind of right that the Universal Dec-
laration enshrines and do we want to have it trump the values
of global welfare?
Article 27 refers to the right to participate in the cultural
life of a community." Does that mean that I have a right to
go to the opera? You know in France, in fact, a recent hot polit-
ical debate after the Socialists came to power in 1997 was over
whether people should have a right, if they are on welfare, to
get a free opera ticket. Does this proposition, seriously debated
in Paris, flow from the Universal Declaration? Similarly, let
me ask what is a right to nationality, or a right not to be de-
prived of nationality, or the right to change nationality?
The Universal Declaration talks about the right to proper-
ty in Article 17.12 How do we weigh the right to property in
Article 17 against the right to Social Security in Article 22, or
against the right to an adequate standard of living in Article
25? Can I be deprived of my property in order that others can
realize their economic, social and cultural rights to go to the
opera, which they, of course, see as indispensable for their
dignity and the free development of their personality? If, yes,
then how will I know when or whether that deprivation was
arbitrary? Will the arbitrator's decision relate to the resources
of the state or the extent of international cooperation? This is
from the language in Article 22."
What is meant by a right to work? Or free choice of em-
ployment in Article 23?'1 Will that right be satisfied by gov-
ernments pursuing framework economic policies that discipline
inflation and stimulate investment and global economic wel-
fare? Or is there something more fundamental intended here?
What is the right to just and favorable remuneration? I don't
9. Id. art 15.
10. Pierre Gonzales, L'exception culturele confrontge, LE FIGARO Oct. 15, 1998.
11. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 27.
12. Id. art. 17.
13. Id. art. 22.
14. Id. art. 23.
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think I make enough money in Paris. Have my rights under
the Universal Declaration been violated?
Article 13(1) proclaims a right to labor market mobility,
but only within a state, which is very interesting. 5 Article
13(2) describes a narrower right to leave and return for tourist
purposes between states. 6 Reflecting on the right to labor
market mobility, the Indian government, with a huge number
of unemployed people, would like very much to send people to
work in the United States, which has a very low unemploy-
ment rate. The Indian government actually makes this argu-
ment in the WTO, and states it as an expression of rights,
citing the Universal Declaration. These are some of the rights
that are difficult to understand, or make sense of, that one
finds in the Universal Declaration.
We need a fuller view of what we mean by human rights.
It is not just a matter of slave labor or child labor. Even with
child labor we need a fuller view. Again, we can learn from
Indian and also from Indonesian perspectives on child labor.
They may ask if we find something morally offensive about a
twelve year-old working in a factory, whether we would rather
have him or her work on a street corner as a prostitute. That's
the choice for many large families that are destitute. It would
be nice to say that the Indian government has a responsibility
to construct schools and send these children to schools rather
than to work in the factories. The Indian government doesn't
have the money to construct the schools, however. In order to
do that, they have to pursue framework economic policies that
promote investment and trade for faster development of global
economic welfare, including Indian welfare.
Countries have to pursue policies that will lead to an effi-
cient form of production and distribution that will enable to
them to build the schools and the hospitals they need to give
meaning to the economic rights of this Universal Declaration.
They were given meaning, I suppose, in the welfare context of
the post-war era. I must confess, though, that the economic
rights have always struck me as particularly difficult to take
seriously since the countries that listed these economic rights
all had colonies from whom they were stealing at the time they
15. Id. art. 13(1).
16. Id. art. 13(2).
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were writing the Universal Declaration. That is how they fund-
ed the social welfare system in so many of these countries.
However, it is not my purpose here to belittle the Univer-
sal Declaration which, I acknowledge, has been an important
rhetorical anchor in the struggle for freedom for many people
throughout the world. Rather, I want to underscore some of
the complexities of beginning to conceptualize a linkage be-
tween globalization and human rights. I want to suggest that,
at best, human rights can be thought of as bundles of rights
and that individuals and societies may choose to include and to
emphasize different elements at different times in response to
different circumstances. Admittedly, there is something deeply
unsettling about a conceptual reading of something so funda-
mental as a human right. At times there may be a certain
clear international consensus of what elements should be in
the human rights bundle, what elements cannot be taken out
of the bundle. In those circumstances, it would be easier to
talk about the linkage between globalization and human
rights.
The international consensus is, to me, crucial in bringing
together globalization and human rights. As someone who once
fought very hard for economic sanctions against South Africa, I
would point out that there was an international consensus,
reflected in resolutions passed in the General Assembly of the
United Nations, that, in fact, apartheid was a crime. Where
that international consensus exists, I believe that we all, as
intelligent and fully informed human beings, can make the
choice to have a lesser degree of global welfare, a lesser degree
of the productive and distributive efficiency that gives rise to
that global welfare, because there are certain higher values to
which we all agree. Without that international consensus, I
would suggest that we really shouldn't interfere with globaliza-
tion in the name of selective violations of human rights.
In the last section, I suggested that judging from the expe-
rience under the Universal Declaration, it may be easier to
delineate the scope of political rights than economic rights.
This gives rise to a series of questions relating to globalization.
First, does the open national or multilateral trade and invest-
ment rule-making at the heart of globalization support or un-
dermine the political rights described above? Second, does the
open national or multilateral rule-making at the heart of glob-
alization support or undermine the economic rights described
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above?
I have found the work of Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew
Warner of the Harvard Institute of International Development
to be a very powerful resource in answering both these ques-
tions." In the mid-1990s, Sachs and Warner waded into a ten
year-old debate in development economics about whether there
is a tendency for poorer countries to grow more rapidly than
richer countries. Until the mid-1980s, that model-the "Solow
Growth Model"-which assumed the traditional neoclassical
constant returns to scale was widely accepted in the develop-
ment economics literature. Then, growth models which incorpo-
rated increasing returns to scale, tended to predict that rich
countries would maintain or increase their advantage over
poorer countries.'" Subsequent research has shown that con-
vergence holds among the richest countries, namely the OECD
countries, but not among the richest and poorest.19 Some of
this literature suggests, at best, rather pessimistically (if not
euphemistically), that only countries with an adequate initial
level of human capital endowments can take advantage of
modern technology to lead to convergent growth.
Sachs and Warner offer a more optimistic take on conver-
gence. They argue that countries with appropriate political
rights and open economies can join the "convergence club."
They demonstrate that poor countries that have followed stan-
dard market-based economic policies, including respect for
private property rights and open international trade, tend
overwhelmingly towards convergence. This holds true even for
countries that start with extremely low levels of human capital
endowments and extremely low levels of initial per capita
income. An "inappropriate" property rights policy was assumed
to be one of the following: a socialist economy; prolonged civil
or foreign conflict; or extreme deprivation of civil or political
rights. A closed economy was assumed to be any one of the
following: a very high proportion of imports covered by quota
restrictions; a high proportion of exports covered by state mo-
17. See JEFFREY D. SACHS & ANDREW M. WARNER, ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE
AND ECONOMIC POLICIES (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
5039, 1995).
18. See Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, 94 J. POL.
ECON. 1002 (1986).
19. See CONVERGENCE OF PRoDucTivrry (William J. Baumol, Richard R. Nel-
son et al. eds., 1994).
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nopolies and state-set prices; a socialist economic structure; or
a black market premium over the official exchange rate.
With a sample of 117 countries, Sachs and Warner then
grouped countries into groups: qualifying countries and non-
qualifying countries. Qualifying countries had to satisfy both
the appropriate political and economic tests. Those that failed
one of the tests were classified as non-qualifying countries.
Three conclusions are of interest here. First, qualifying coun-
tries experienced significantly higher growth rates than non-
qualifying countries. Second, the economic openness test
proved to be the main determinant of whether a country was a
non-qualifier. With all but two discrete examples, all countries
that failed the political test, also failed the economic test.
Third, cross-sectional analysis demonstrated that the political
variables do significantly influence the rate of growth. Sachs
and Warner suggest, therefore, that adoption of appropriate
political and economic policies is a sufficient condition to pro-
duce economic growth and development. However, their study
suggests that the adoption of these policies is not a necessary
condition for economic growth and development because sever-
al non-qualifying countries, notably China, achieved similar
rates of growth to those achieved by qualifying countries.
Let me now return to the questions that I posed at the
beginning of this section of this Paper. Do the open economic
policies that underpin globalization promote economic develop-
ment, and therefore, economic rights? The answer, according to
Sachs and Warner, is certainly affirmative. And, also there is
an important corollary-political rights in combination with
open economic policies reinforce economic development, and
therefore economic rights. Do open economic policies necessari-
ly lead to political rights? Here the answer appears to be nega-
tive because of the performance of countries like China. How-
ever, there is no indication that open economic policies dimin-
ish political rights. In fact, from a dynamic point of view, the
cross-sectional work suggests that over-time, in most cases
open economic policies would support the evolution of political
rights.
Before concluding this section of the Paper, let me also
address a possible objection to my line of argument here. The
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that have mobilized
against recent multilateral trade and investment liberalization
citing a concern for human rights have focused on the issue of
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increasing inequality between and within countries." The
Sachs and Warner data refutes strongly the assertion that
open economies or globalization are responsible for growth
disparities among countries. It is the absence of globalization,
if anything, that contributes to the maintenance or increase in
these disparities between countries. The other issue, however,
is about the income disparities within countries. It is apparent
that these disparities are increasing both within developed and
developing countries. However, it is important to distinguish
between absolute and relative economic progress. In both cas-
es, putting the non-qualifying countries to one-side (which by
definition have not participated in globalization to a great
degree) the living standards of people have increased dramati-
cally.2' The question, therefore, is whether it is possible to
address the issue of relative income inequality within countries
within the framework of economic liberalization. If not, should
the process of liberalization be arrested if that also means
arresting the absolute progress with respect to living stan-
dards? Recent OECD work has shown that the source of these
income disparities is rooted in the gap between highly-skilled
labor and unskilled labor." Accordingly, since basic education
and training expenditures are not countervailable subsidies
within the framework of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties, how can countries organize so as to
narrow the skills gap? For my purposes here, all that I want to
establish is that a retreat from globalization is not necessary to
accomplish those objectives.
I think that there are two points that emerge from this
discussion so far. First, globalization is, by and large, a good
thing. It is good because it promotes allocative and productive
efficiency, which in turn increase overall economic welfare.
20. See International NGO Committee on Human Rights in Trade and Invest-
ment Press Release (Sept. 1 1998).
21. This is a distinction that has not been considered fully, if at all, in some
of the more recent studies that purport to address the issue of globalization, in-
equality, and economic growth. See generally DAVID WOODWARD, GLOBALIZATION,
UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY: RECENT TRENDS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
(U.N. Development Programme Working Paper Series No. 4, 1998).
22. See generally OECD, KEY EMPLOYMENT POLICY CHALLENGES FACED BY
OECD COUNTRIES: LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL POLICY OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 31
DEELSA/ELSA/WD(98) 2 (1998); OECD, LABOUR MARKET POLICIES: NEW POLICY
CHALLENGES FOR LOW PAID WORKERS AND UNSKILLED JOB SEEKERS, OECD/GD(97)
160 (1997).
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Human rights are also good things because they reinforce the
essential worth and dignity of human beings. However, human
rights break down into further categories of rights: economic,
social/cultural, and political rights. Achieving these goals may
sometimes be in conflict with each other, and with the econom-
ic goals of globalization. It is perhaps easiest to reconcile the
goals of economic rights with the goals of globaliza-
tion-development and growth.
Are there different institutional choices that could be made
to achieve these goals? Perhaps so, but there must be a com-
mon means of analyzing whether a given institutional ap-
proach is better-suited to achieving the common goals. The
economic evidence that I reviewed in the last section of this
Paper strongly suggests a model for achieving the goal of
growth and development. That model builds on trade and in-
vestment liberalization, and political freedom broadly mea-
sured. The recognition of the second component is key because
it provides a way to address the other perspectives of human
rights while achieving the economic goals. This is admittedly a
very utilitarian approach to thinking about these issues, but it
is one that follows from the economic evidence that tends to-
wards the presumption in favor of globalization as supportive
of human rights. One could argue about other institutional
choices, but in a sense, the evidence is in." The politics-driv-
en or nation-based approach to these issues has not secured
better results in achieving its goals than market-based interna-
tional approaches.
I don't mean to reject all further role for theorizing about
institutional choice. Once the presumption in favor of open-
market solutions is accepted, there is still scope to argue about
particular cases. For instance, let's take the case of trade and
labor standards. Some trade unionists in the developed world
23. Here I am using the terms "goal choice" and "institutional choice" as de-
veloped by Neil Komesar in his work on comparative institutional analysis. See
NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). My argument is that the institutional
choice of market economics has been revealed to be the best available alternative
to achieve the chosen goals of economic growth and political freedom. Although, I
would agree that his "participation-centered approach" to institutional analysis
might help explain some of the relative successes among both the "qualifying" and
the "non-qualifying" countries identified in the Sachs/Warner research discussed
above.
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may sincerely believe that banning child labor will enshrine a
greater dignity and worth of the children in developing coun-
tries. However, many governments and workers' organizations
from those countries disagree. Thus, two opportunities for
discussion and evaluation of institutional choices emerge.
First, we could ask whether binding or voluntary multilateral
rules would best achieve the human rights goals whether de-
fined along a political or economic dimension. Second, if we
accept the utility of such rules, we could ask whether they are
better placed in the context of the multilateral trading system
and its institutions, or in some other specialized institution.
Would placing them squarely within the WTO rules-based
system further those rights more than they would detract from
the liberalizing goals of the WTO? In a sense, this is the dis-
cussion that led to the WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration
leaving these issues largely to the International Labor Organi-
zation (ILO), and led in June of this year to the compromise
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work. 4
In short, what I am arguing for is a general presumption
in favor of free markets, that can be trumped by other values if
the objectives of the other values can not demonstrably be
served better by market-based solutions subject to a principle
of least trade/competition restrictiveness. I readily concede,
however, that an exception to this rule is needed to address a
very narrow class of egregious human rights violations, e.g.
genocide and apartheid which the international community has
rejected in accordance with principles of international law
evidenced by U.N. Resolutions, perhaps, and other sources of
customary international law, perhaps, as well. In these cases,
the presumption in favor of markets, and the implicit utilitari-
an goal choice and institutional choice is lifted because of the
multilateral consensus (Interestingly, the GATT has long taken
this approach to dealing with security exceptions, although not
with the general exceptions that might implicate issues of
environmental rights, for instance.)' I would not lift the pre-
24. See generally Elisabeth Cappuyns, Linking Labor Standards and Trade
Sanctions: An Analysis of Their Current Relationship, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
659 (1998); Ignacio A. Donoso Rubio, Economic Limits on International Regulation:
A Case Study of ILO Standard-Setting, 24 QUEEN'S L.J. 189 (1998).
25. See generally World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report on United
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sumption on the basis of unilateral decisions by individual
states because it seems to me that the risk posed to the over-
riding economic objectives-whether expressed in terms of
globalization or economic rights-is simply too great.
III. CONCLUSION
In concluding, I want to address the issue of whose voice
matters, or should matter, in discussions about globalization
and human rights. Clearly, those affected directly by globaliza-
tion through trade or investment ought to have a voice. So the
industrial worker in India or Indonesia should have a voice in
the discussion of labor standards for instance. The workers in
the developed countries who may lose their jobs through indus-
trial reorganization should also have a voice about the impact
of trade and investment decisions that affect their life. The
governments and the firms also have an obvious interest in
this issue. The difficult question, as always, is how to, and who
should resolve any conflicts among the participants.
To the extent that my suggested framework were em-
braced, then we would have a general idea how to resolve the
conflict because the presumption, by and large would apply. In
a particular case, the issue of who would decide could be left to
further discussion of institutional choice. What needs more
exploration, however, is the role of the NGOs in this process.
What should their role be in advancing these issues? How
should we determine who is a representative voice, with a
stake in the issue at hand? Who should listen to them? How
much transparency and democratic accountability should be
required of those who seek to influence these issues? In par-
ticular, how should their voice be integrated into negotiations,
and dispute settlement proceedings? I don't have answers to
those questions today, but I think that answers are particular-
ly important as the NGOs begin to play a more active role in
the great debates about globalization and human rights.
Let me give you an example. There are nongovernmental
groups, such as the International NGO Committee on Human
Rights and Trade and Investment, that come to international
organizations. They talk about human rights and about the
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R, available in 1998 WL 720123.
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disparities between poor countries and rich countries, and so
on. Whose interests are these NGOs serving? There is a moral
high ground that people often take when they talk about hu-
man rights, but I am not more impressed with missionaries of
the left than I am with missionaries on the right. Moreover,
there is very little transparency; no one knows who funded
them; there is no question of democratic accountability. I think
we have to ask why we should listen to these NGOs instead of
to the democratically-elected governments of the countries.
These are important issues. We need to think seriously
about how we talk about integrating concerns of human rights
into the debate. We need to begin with the first article of the
Universal Declaration, and acknowledge the dignity and worth
of all human beings, which includes the leaders and the people
of the third world countries who are trying to develop their
economies.
We need to have a little bit more humility when we look to
questions of economics and compare them with issues of hu-
man rights. We need to find a way to listen to a wide range of
voices. The voices of workers in North America, who would
rather make inefficient color TVs than allow color TVs to be
manufactured where they can be made more cheaply, are not
the only ones we should hear. We should be in favor of struc-
tures that make global welfare higher for all of us.
In closing, I am quite prepared to emphasize the economic
rights of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well
as the political rights. To defend those economic rights, I am
going to use an economic model that has proven to work. There
is no other model that has worked. Anyone who advocates
another model must convince us it will work. Otherwise, the
model that has brought us trade and development must contin-
ue, and there must be a presumption in favor of this model.
Although this view of the linkage between globalization and
human rights may not be very popular, I had to bring you
some hard truths from the old continent.
[Vol. XXV:I112
THE GLOBALIZATION OF ECONOMIC
HUMAN RIGHTS
Steve Charnovitz*
I. INTRODUCTION
We have just heard two very interesting presentations by
Frank Garcia and Mark Warner. I have been asked to offer
comments on both papers and on the issues before us at this
conference. The conference organizers succeeded in arranging
for two very different perspectives to be presented on the first
panel. Professor Garcia is worried about globalization and sees
inherent tension between international trade law and interna-
tional human rights law. Mr. Warner is worried more about
the political response to globalization. He would agree that
there is tension between trade law and social values, but
would resolve this tension by relying upon the market.
Garcia does a good job of framing the important issues.
Globalization is a problem because it makes it harder for the
State to regulate (he calls this "regulatory impotence"). This
occurs both because the market influences governments (e.g.,
capital mobility) and because globalization spurs international
agencies to impose more restrictions on national governments.
Yet, in other ways, Garcia perceives that globalization presents
new opportunities. Globalization can help reorient the interna-
tional regulatory system toward more liberal and less statist
lines. In this scenario, the market would come to be regulated
according to the principles of individual dignity and rights as
"defined by a transnational polity itself." Garcia puts it well
when he says "insofar as globalization involves the elimination
of governmental interference with private economic decision
making, then globalization can itself be seen as a direct en-
hancement of human rights."
Garcia seems to lean over backward to be fair to the mar-
ket-centered perspective before he criticizes it. He notes that a
globalized market spreads ideas and values and may strength-
* Steve Charnovitz practices law at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering in Washing-
ton, D.C. At the time of the Conference, he was director of the Global Environ-
ment & Trade Study at Yale University.
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en domestic pressure for increased political and social rights.
He credits international trade law with bequeathing a respect
for the rule of law, and points out that such respect serves as a
core principle of international human rights law.
Having made these points, Garcia then aims his cannon at
international economic law and international trade law. He
says that international economic law and international human
rights law "are, if not incompatible, then at least in fundamen-
tal tension." This "conflict" exists because international eco-
nomic law "is based on a set of values which are fundamentally
antithetical to the values on which the modern human rights
movement is based." Garcia explains that economic law is
utilitarian while human rights law is deontological. Economic
law is based on a process of exchange and preference satisfac-
tion, while human rights law embodies minimum standards of
treatment that recognize the equal moral worth of each indi-
vidual. Because of the deontological nature of human rights,
Garcia claims, human rights law is resistant to trade-offs.
Warner does not agree that international economic law
and human rights law are in constant tension. He sees eco-
nomic globalization as benign and declares that these two
bodies of law run in the same direction. In Warner's view, the
market and human rights can coexist. Indeed, he believes that
they reinforce each other.
Warner could have rested the defense there, but in his
usual provocative way, he tries to stimulate our thinking. He
brings his skeptical eye to the text of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights' and finds it "hopelessly incoherent." He
explains that child labor can be defensible because working in
a factory may be better for a child than working in the under-
ground economy.
Although he does not directly address Garcia on this point,
Warner does not share the vision of a "transnational polity."
Warner is troubled by the growing role of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in international policymaking. He gives
an example of the International NGO Committee on Human
Rights in Trade and Investment and wonders why this group
objects to new treaties. He has heard the International NGO
1. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declara-
tion].
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Committee call for greater transparency and democratic ac-
countability in intergovernmental organizations, and that leads
Warner to wonder who is financing this NGO and how demo-
cratic its procedures are.
II. ECONOMIC VERSUS HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Let me first address the tension between international
economic/trade law and human rights law.2 I think Garcia lays
out the issues fairly, but I agree with Warner that there is
more to the story. There is greater synergy between interna-
tional trade law and international human rights law than is
generally recognized. When I look at international human
rights law, which Garcia characterizes as deontological, I per-
ceive that it is also efficiency oriented. (For example, Warner
alludes to research by Jeff Sachs showing that democratic
government can promote economic growth.) When I look at
international trade law, which Garcia characterizes as utilitar-
ian, I perceive that it can also be deontological in affirming the
rights of individuals to conduct transborder transactions.
This year we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. But we also celebrate
fifty years of another legal landmark, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Is this mere coincidence? Or is
there something deeper to be noticed-that the postwar United
Nations made it a high priority to launch better regimes for
both human rights and world trade. Indeed, the relationship
looks even stronger when one recalls that new trade law was
to be embodied in the International Trade Organization
(ITO),3 which contained provisions relating to full employ-
2. There is a lot of good recent scholarship on these issues. See, e.g., Raj
Bhala, Clarifying the Trade-Labor Link, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11 (1998);
Sarah Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1533 (1998); Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the
TRIPs Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 357 (1998); C. O'Neal Taylor, Linkage and Rule-Making: Observations on
Trade and Investment and Trade and Labor, 19 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 639
(1998). See also David Weissbrodt & Marci Hoffman, The Global Economy and
Human Rights: A Selective Bibliography, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 189 (1997)
(tracing the development and the relationship between human rights, trade, labor,
business, foreign investment, and the global economy).
3. See Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Confer-
ence on Trade and Employment, ch. II, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 2/78 (1948).
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ment,4 fair labor standards,5 and economic development.6 Un-
fortunately, the ITO never came into being.
When they are viewed in a stylized way, international
trade law and international human rights law can look differ-
ent. International trade law focuses on the market while inter-
national human rights law focuses on the individual. Interna-
tional trade law is utilitarian while international human rights
law is deontological. International trade law centers on values
of wealth and well-being, while international human rights law
centers on affection and respect. International trade law looks
at cross-border transactions while international human rights
law looks at intra-border transactions.
But when they are viewed more abstractly, international
trade law and international human rights law grow in resem-
blance. Indeed, I would argue that they are topologically simi-
lar. Both international trade law and international human
rights law are largely deregulatory-they declare what the
State should not do. In each regime, the problem to be solved
is the overbearing State which wants to control voluntary
activity (e.g., buying, selling,, associating, or protesting) that
may be beneficial for the individuals involved, but is construed
as being bad for the State. This problem is solved with inter-
national rules that seek to prevent States from making the
wrong utilitarian judgment about the value of human freedom.
In both regimes, States agree to international norms that in-
spire them to give more space to the individual. International
trade law and international human rights law are also similar
in being non-dependent regimes. That is, the operation of the
regime does not really depend on the degree of combined gov-
ernmental participation.7 Contrast that with other policy
goals, like protecting the ozone layer, conserving fisheries,
4. Id. arts. 2, 3.
5. Id. Article 7 states that member States "recognize that unfair labor condi-
tions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in international trade,
and, accordingly, each member shall take whatever action may be feasible and
appropriate to eliminate such conditions within its territory." Id. art. 7.
6. Id. arts. 8-11. Some of these concerns are mirrored in the Universal Dec-
laration. See Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 23.1 (the right to work and
protection against unemployment), art. 20.1 (freedom of association), art. 23.1 (just
and favorable conditions of work), art. 23.4 (the right to form and join trade un-
ions), and art. 24 (the right to rest).
7. In other words, Country A can permit free trade and respect human
rights even though Country B does not.
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controlling epidemics, avoiding the proliferation of weapons,
and maintaining peace, in which the essence of the regime is
to prevent defection and encourage cooperation.
Of course, neither international trade law nor internation-
al human rights law is exclusively deregulatory. In the Uru-
guay Round, governments agreed to require that each member
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) provide legal protec-
tion for intellectual property to foreign applicants. In the hu-
man rights regime, there are many provisions that suggest
more government intervention. For example, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states that "Everyone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing, and medical care ...... But I would suggest that
such aspirational provisions are not what gives international
human rights law its authority.
The problem with propounding such "positive" rights is not
just that they are vague and hard to operationalize. The deep-
er problem is that such "rights" will always conflict with other
rights. Although Garcia states that international human rights
law is resistant to trade-offs, once the regime goes beyond
negative rights (that is, leaving individuals alone) and moves
to positive rights (that is, guaranteeing outcomes), there will
always be trade-offs. There will be trade-offs between out-
comes-for example, housing versus medical care. And there
will be trade-offs between the right of the individual to keep
the income he earns and the power of the State to redistribute
it to others.
It should also be noted that international trade law has
traditionally not been articulated as upholding the rights of
the individual. Technically, it is one step removed. In other
words, the raison d'gtre of the GATT was not to allow individu-
als in different countries to carry out mutually beneficial
transactions. Rather, it was to help governments enter into
"reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed
to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce." This is not the same thing as saying
8. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 25.1.
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
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that people have a right to trade. But if we peel off the mer-
cantilism from international trade law, which looks at States
as trading entities, we discern that the true beneficiaries of
GATT are the individual traders.
Our debate on this panel points to the need for more
thinking about achieving synthesis between international trade
law and international human rights law. It probably goes too
far to suggest that they are fundamentally the same law. But
we should be more aware of their commonalities and potential
synergies. International trade law needs to become more like
international human rights law in establishing norms for what
a State owes its own citizens. International human rights law
needs to become more like international trade law in enforcing
norms through mandatory dispute settlement and potential
penalties for non-compliance.
Let me illustrate this theoretical presentation with a con-
sideration of some points of interface between international
trade law and international human rights law. Consider the
issue of how States treat aliens. This issue has been a long-
time concern of both bodies of law, and logically so, because
aliens are more vulnerable to oppression than members of a
community." The first norm that evolved was national treat-
ment (i.e., treating the alien no worse than the national). For
example, in the treaty of 1836 between the United States and
the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, the two parties agreed to give
judicial recourse to citizens of the other party
on the same terms as are usual and customary with the na-
tives or citizens of the country in which they may be; for
which purpose they may employ, in defence of their rights,
such advocates, solicitors, notaries, agents, and factors, as
they may judge proper .... 
Analogously, in the treaty of 1926 between the United States
and El Salvador, the parties agreed that the nationals and
merchandise of one party would receive the same treatment
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, pmbl. [hereinafter GATT].
10. The concern can be traced back to early ecclesiastic law. For example, in
Leviticus 24:22, it is said: "Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the
stranger, as for one of your own country: for I am the Lord your God."
11. Convention on Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 30,
1836, U.S.-Peru-Bol. Confederation, art. IX, 2 Malloy 1375, 1378.
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within the territory of the other party as nationals and mer-
chandise of the other party, with regard to internal taxes. 2
Another norm that evolved was a minimum standard of treat-
ment for the alien. For example, we see this in the Red Cross
treaty of 1906 (human rights) and in the Customs Simplifica-
tion Convention of 1923 (economic law).13
While the paradigm concern for international trade law
remains the treatment of the alien, international human rights
law is more concerned about the way that a State treats its
own citizens. But these respective concerns inform each other.
There have been episodes in which guarantees to aliens on
human rights have led to an upgrading of the treatment grant-
ed to citizens. For example in 1864, Switzerland and France
concluded a treaty that provided for rights of establishment by
French traders (irrespective of religion). Following this treaty,
Switzerland decided that it made little sense for it to continue
denying such rights to its own Jewish citizens, and so it
changed its Constitution.'4 Although international trade law
norms have not generally been applied internally within a
State, the new intellectual property provisions in the WTO will
lead to such osmosis because the baseline intellectual property
protection required for foreign inventors and authors is also
being granted to domestic inventors and authors.
Our limited progress in integrating international trade law
and international human rights law can be seen in the attempt
to negotiate the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI),15 within the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). The negotiators viewed MAI as a
part of international trade law. They did not view it as inter-
national human rights law. Although the human rights regime
is not embarrassed to discuss how a State treats its own citi-
12. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Feb. 22, 1926, U.S.-
El Sal., art. VIII, 7 Bevans 521, 525.
13. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in
Armies in the Field, July 6, 1906, art. 1, 2 Malloy 2183 (providing that the sick
and wounded would be cared for without distinction of nationality); International
Convention Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities, Nov. 3, 1923,
art. 4, 30 L.N.T.S. 372 (providing that no customs regulation shall be enforced
before such regulations have been published and providing an exception thereto).
14. See Jean Baneth, Comment, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TION 271, 274 (Anne 0. Krueger ed., 1998).
15. See Multilateral Agreement on Investment (as of 24 April 1998) (visited
Feb. 11, 1999) <http-Jwww.oecd.org/DAF/CMIS/MAINEGTEXT.htm>.
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zens, the international trade law framework views that as too
intrusive of "sovereignty." Thus, the MAI talks sought to pro-
tect only foreign investors. But in seeking to upgrade interna-
tional disciplines on the expropriation of property, the MAI
negotiators ran into the buzzsaw of giving greater protection to
foreign investors than domestic investors. This alarmed vari-
ous interest groups who feared that if the MAI agreement gave
greater rights against "regulatory takings," there would be
pressure to protect domestic investors against indirect expro-
priation too.
It is not surprising that environmentalists opposed to the
concept of regulatory takings would oppose the MAI for that
reason. But what was surprising is that this concern drew
some sympathy from the trade policy community. For example,
Monty Graham of the Institute for International Economics
wrote that:
[T]he critics [of MAI] are right in this regard: it would unac-
ceptably encroach on governments' sovereignty to impose, via
a multilateral agreement, a doctrine of compensation for
regulatory taking that is not generally accepted in domestic
law. Whether or not such compensation should be awarded is
not the issue. Rather, that is a matter that should be decided
at the level of national (or even subnational) governments,
not in a multilateral negotiation. And while a multilateral
agreement on investment should provide for strong investor
protection, this protection should not exceed that which
would be afforded similar domestic investments under es-
tablished and accepted principles of law.16
This statement demonstrates how immature international
trade law is in comparison to international human rights law.
Whereas international human rights law aims to transmit
norms from international law to domestic law (e.g., ILO trea-
ties, the Genocide Convention, and so on), international trade
law takes as a given that the responsibilities of a government
towards citizen property owners is a matter to be determined
by each government, not by the international community. In-
deed, there is a recoiling from the idea that the established
16. Edward M. Graham, Trade and Investment at the WTO: Just Do It., in
LAUNCHING NEW GLOBAL TRADE TALKS: AN ACTION AGENDA 151, 163 (Jeffrey J.
Schott ed., 1998).
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principles of domestic economic law might be improved
through multilateral talks. By using the international trade
law style, rather than the international human rights law
style, the MAI negotiators backed themselves into a corner of
being unable to upgrade international norms against measures
tantamount to expropriation. Regulatory takings is obviously a
difficult issue and I am not suggesting that there is any simple
solution to it. But if the MAI negotiation had been conducted
as a matter of both international trade law and international
human rights law, then it might have been easier to debate the
central issues.
III. PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
The issues before this conference have received a lot of
attention this year. A few weeks ago, President Clinton told
the Joint IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting that "[we must
put a human face on the world economy."7 Garcia suggests
that "[tihe WTO should recognize the legitimacy of trade sanc-
tions for egregious human rights violations either unilaterally
applied, or under the jurisdiction of an international human
rights body." I agree with Garcia on that point, and believe
that more attention by the trade regime to human rights
would strengthen the WTO.1' It has been little noted that the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture gives attention to a human
rights concern-food security. Article 12 states that in institut-
ing new export controls on foodstuffs, a government "shall give
due consideration to the effects of such prohibition or restric-
tion on importing Members' food security."19
17. Pres. William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks to IMF/World Bank Annual
Meeting (Oct. 6, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (critics
feared that the President had his own face in mind).
18. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J.
INTL L. 689 (1998); Steve Charnovit, The World Trade Organization and Social
Issues, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 17 (Oct. 1994).
19. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotia-
tions, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. The Final Act establishing
the World Trade Organization contains a series of annexed additional agreements
and legal instruments dealing with trade in goods and services. The most impor-
tant of these being the annexed "Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods,"
which includes six Understandings concerning the interpretation of its articles, and
12 substantive agreements, including the Agreement on Agriculture. Id. at Annex
IA, WTO Agreement on Agriculture, art. 12.1(a).
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Warner is cautious about deepening human rights. Indeed,
he is skeptical of many of the rights already included in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For example, he
points out his puzzlement regarding cultural rights and won-
ders what they were. I would respond that perhaps they are a
little puzzling at times, but the notion of cultural rights is not
something that was invented in 1948 in the Universal Declara-
tion. It goes back at least as early as the Minorities Treaties
under the League of Nations in 1919, a series of treaties that
establish rights of communities and cultures and linguistic mi-
norities. - So it is an older tradition than the Universal Decla-
ration and one that I think is quite fundamental to our appre-
ciation of human rights in the twentieth Century.
Perhaps Warner would agree with me on this point; I
think the Universal Declaration does not go far enough in
some areas. It is particularly weak on the topic of economic
rights important to helping individuals realize their full poten-
tial in a global economy. For example, I would like to enshrine
the right of individuals to export, to import, to invest, and to
divest.
On the other hand, it should be noted that the Universal
Declaration is strong on at least one transborder issue. Article
19 states that everyone has a right to "receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers." The issue of e-trade and the transmission of data is
a very active one in trade policy today. The U.S. government
forbids the export of high-level encryption software. The Euro-
pean Commission is trying to ban the export of data about
individuals to countries that do not ensure an adequate level of
privacy protection."' These issues have been characterized in
trade talks as commerce versus security or as commerce versus
privacy. But so far they have not been perceived as issues of
human rights.
As noted above, Warner expresses concern about the in-
creasing role of NGO coalitions at the OECD and the WTO. He
20. The fascinating history of international human rights is told in a new
book. See PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS-VISIONS SEEN (1998).
21. See Council Directive No. 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, art. 2(c), O.J. L 281131, at 38 (1995).
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wonders what legitimacy international NGOs have to speak at
meetings with governments. Let me try to answer that. Al-
though I disagreed with how the NGO networks attacked the
MAI, I believe that organizations of like-minded people have a
right to make their views known to global agencies. A transna-
tional NGO gets its legitimacy at the WTO in the same way
that a citizen gets legitimacy to petition a government. Article
6 of the Universal Declaration provides the answer in stating
that "[elveryone has the right of recognition everywhere as a
person before the law." I think the growth of transnational
civil society is a very positive development that can improve
international trade law in the same way that it has improved
international human rights law."
Let me call your attention to a recent decision by the WTO
Appellate Body that has important implications for NGOs. In
the Turtle-Shrimp case, the Appellate Body ruled that WTO
procedures permit dispute panels to consider unsolicited ami-
cus curiae briefs from NGOs.2" This will allow NGOs to pres-
ent observations about the legal and factual issues in a dis-
pute. Although few international trade cases in the past have
implicated human rights, there will surely be more such cases
in the future. Soon, there will be a WTO panel reviewing the
dispute between the European Commission and the U.S. gov-
ernment over a Massachusetts state procurement law that
seeks to steer business away from vendors who do business
with Myanmar (Burma)." The Appellate Body ruling provides
an opportunity for a law school human rights clinic to find a
client NGO that wants to support Massachusetts, and then to
submit an amicus brief for this client to the WTO panel. The
brief could explain why WTO law (international trade law)
ought to tolerate procurement penalties against companies
that seek to profit from transactions with pariah governments
like Myanmar that require forced labor.
22. See generally WILLIAM KOREY, NGOS AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUmAN RIGHTS "A CuRious GRAPEVINE" (1998).
23. WTO Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibitions of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58IAB/R, paras. 108-10 (Oct. 12,
1998).
24. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289 (D.
Mass. 1998) (discussing facts of the so-called "Massachusetts Burma Law").
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IV. CONCLUSION
Our conference asks the question: Is the global market a
friend or a foe of human rights? Certainly, global markets have
the potential to interfere with the attainment of human rights.
Since all markets are composed of voluntary, mutually benefi-
cial transactions, one might wonder how a transaction that
makes two people better off can interfere with anyone's rights.
The answer is that this can occur because of the spillover im-
pact on individuals external to the transaction. For example, a
purchase of a chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) can engender produc-
tion of the CFC which can deplete the ozone layer. A series of
currency transactions can destabilize an economy and cause
unemployment. The hiring of a child for factory work can lead
to future health costs that are socialized upon the community.
Competition between governments to attract investment can
lead to a retrenchment on worker rights. For any transaction,
these and similar possibilities need to be considered in order to
reach conclusions about whether markets are raising or lower-
ing human rights.
When markets are found to be a foe of human rights, then
it would be appropriate to take collective action to improve
that aspect of the way the market operates. This could be done
by governments through changes in international economic
and human rights law and by NGOs through social labels and
publicity. Our two presenters would probably disagree on par-
ticular changes in international law, but would probably agree
that economic globalization will continue and that it may re-
quire greater inter-governmental oversight.
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DOES GLOBALIZATION ADVANCE
HUMAN RIGHTSV
Jeffrey L. Dunoff
I. INTRODUCTION
Louis Henkin famously proclaimed that ours is the Age of
Rights.' But it is certainly also the Age of Globalization. Sur-
prisingly, the relationships between these two phenomena
have received little scholarly attention. This Symposium offers
a superb opportunity to initiate an overdue examination of
these issues.
In this short essay, I will address many of the issues my
co-panelists raised from a slightly different perspective. In
particular, I will develop three different arguments. First, I
will show why the two dominant stories about globalization
and rights--one in which they are mutually supportive and
one in which they are deeply antagonistic-are misleading.
Second, I will present a more nuanced, and more ambiguous,
story about the relationship between globalization and rights.
And finally, I will outline the challenge ahead and identify
strategies for ensuring that globalization is more friend than
foe to human rights. While I cannot fully develop any of these
arguments in this brief commentary, I hope to contribute to a
richer debate over the relationship between globalization and
enhanced human rights.
t Copyright © 1999 by Jeffrey L. Dunoff.
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IL GLOBALIZATION AND RIGHTS: FRIENDS OR FOES?
There are two dominant stories about globalization and
rights. At the risk of oversimplification, the first story teaches
that economic liberalization and expanded international mar-
kets are a vehicle for increasing economic wealth and, indirect-
ly, human rights. The theoretical premise here is that long-
term growth depends largely on increased productivity and
innovation, and that the incentives for both depend on the size
of the relevant markets.2 Expanded markets thus create both
greater incentives for innovators, and permit fixed production
costs to be spread over larger production runs. Moreover, the
globalized economy permits a "highly refined division of labor,
in which final goods... are produced in multi[statel opera-
tions, with the labor-intensive parts of the production process
reserved for the developing countries."3 Thus globalization
creates a "win-win" situation, where developed nations benefit
by selling new innovations to larger markets, and developing
nations enjoy the fruits of these innovations and participate in
the production of manufactured goods.
This economic theory is buttressed by the empirical claim
that nations with open economies typically enjoy greater rates
of growth than nations with closed economies.4 The wealth
that increased trade and investment make possible permits the
funding of social and economic welfare programs, and the sat-
isfaction of economic and social rights. Moreover, for many
nations, economic openness-and the resulting trade in
ideas-creates pressures for political openness and the satis-
faction of civil and political rights.'
This story does not purport to be merely descriptive. It is
also normative. In this story, the institutions supporting the
2. See Jeffrey Sachs, International Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of
Globalization, 110 FOREIGN POLYf 97, 100 (1998).
3. Id.
4. See Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew Warner, Economic Reform and the Process
of Global Integration, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1 (William C.
Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1995); JEFFREY D. SACHS & ANDREW WARNER,
ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE AND ECONOMIC POLICIES (National Bureau of Econ. Re-
search Working Paper No. 5039, 1995). More recent and more sophisticated studies
reach similar conclusions. See, e.g., Sebastian Edwards, Openness, Productivity and
Growth: What Do We Really Know?, 108 ECON. J. 447 (Mar. 1998).
5. See Frank J. Garcia, The Global Market and Human Rights: Trading
Away the Human Rights Principle, 25 BROOK. J. INTL L. 51, 57 (1999).
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globalized economy, such as the GATT/WTO, and the interna-
tional human rights regime rest on similar conceptions of hu-
man freedom and autonomy. Both regimes restrain state ac-
tions that would impede this freedom. These normative claims,
I think, underlie much of Mark Warner's paper.6 In short, this
is a happy story of synergy, as globalization produces wealth
and human rights maximization.
From a quite different perspective comes a darker and
competing counterstory. By focusing primarily on social and
economic rights, and on globalization's distributional effects,
this counterstory is a tale of Globalization as Exploitation. In
this story, a primary effect of globalization is the exacerbation
of gaps between the "haves" and the "have nots." This
counterstory rests on empirical studies showing that globaliza-
tion has been marked by an increasing divergence between the
per capita incomes of the richer and poorer nations.7 More-
over, the increasing divergence between rich and poor occurs
not only among nations, but also within nations. As summa-
rized in a recent United Nations Development Program Work-
ing Paper:
* In LATIN AMERICA, inequality increased substantially
between the 1970s and 1980s, and the income share of
the poorest 40 percent generally fell during the latter de-
cade, with only a limited recovery subsequently;
" In SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, the limited data could suggest
a negative relationship between growth and distribution
and/or a marked shift toward accelerating deterioration,
while rural inequality appears to have increased mark-
edly;
* In SOUTH ASIA, the income share of the poorest 40 per-
cent has been generally stable, except for a serious dete-
rioration in Sri Lanka;
6. See generally Mark A.A. Warner, Globalization and Human Rights: An
Economic Model, 25 BROOK. J. INTL L. 99 (1999).
7. See David Woodward, Globalization, Uneven Development and Poverty:
Recent Trends and Policy Implications (United Nations Dev. Programme Working
Paper No. 4, 1998) (visited Mar. 18, 1999) <http'//www.undp.orgpoverty
/workingpapers/wp.woodword/wp-woodward.html>.
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" In EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION,
there appears to have been a dramatic and continuing
deterioration in income distribution;
" In EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, changes in the income
share of the poorest 40 percent have been gradual and
evenly balanced, except in Korea (where a stronger de-
cline in the 1970s was reversed in the first half of the
1980s). The chronic decline in Thailand since the early
1960s is noteworthy.8
More recent figures tell a similar story. For example, wage
gaps between skilled and unskilled workers have increased in
this decade by more than 30% in Peru, 20% in Colombia, and
nearly 25% in Mexico.' From this perspective, globalization
produces, in Judge Weeramantry's evocative phrase, an inter-
national version of The Grapes of Wrath.
I believe that there are actually three subplots in this
counterstory. The most prominent draws on the Asian financial
crises. This is a tale of globalization producing defenseless
exposure to external shocks and shifts in global markets. The
lesson here is that unfettered financial flows from advanced to
emerging markets can create, at best, vulnerability and, at
worst, ruinous destabilization.' ° The second variation focuses
on the least developed nations. They come under increasing
pressure from international economic institutions to pursue
"sound" domestic policies, which appear to cause, or at least
contribute to, the increasing gaps between the richest and
poorest surveyed above. This is a story of globalization as
marginalization. The third variation focuses on the developed
nations. Here, globalization creates job insecurity, downward
pressure on wages and benefits, and fears of a regulatory race
to the bottom. In short, the counterstory teaches that, while
economic liberalization may produce greater growth, this
growth is highly uneven and is purchased at the price of high-
8. Id.
9. Nancy Birdsall, Life is Unfair: Inequality in the World, 111 FOREIGN POL'Y
76, 78 (1998).
10. For more on the lessons to be drawn from developments in Asia, see
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Understanding Asia's Economic and Environmental Crisis, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265 (1998).
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er levels of income disparities and rates of poverty."
III. A TWICE TOLD TALE: THE RETREAT OF THE STATE
Both stories have strong, if implicit, points of view, and
particular political valences. But for present purposes I am
more interested in a central assumption that both stories
share. The assumption is that we can understand both the
international human rights and economic regimes as mecha-
nisms for constraining state authority and power. 2 Thus, on
the human rights side, the Nuremberg trials represent the
beginning of a movement that restricts what was formerly
state autonomy vis-A-vis its own citizens. And the various
specialized human rights treaties that follow provide further
limits on how states may treat their own citizens. On the eco-
nomic side, a similar phenomena is observed. Expanded WTO
disciplines, increasingly footloose capital, and the world-wide
turn to markets and privatization all appear to have dimin-
ished the autonomy and authority of the state.
But this twice told tale seriously misunderstands the rela-
tionship between the state and both human rights and interna-
tional markets. Contrary to what advocates of the first story
may wish, and what advocates of the counterstory may fear,
neither the human rights regime nor the international econom-
ic regime is premised upon the withering of the state. To the
contrary, both regimes presuppose an activist state.
Consider, first, the human rights regime. Civil and politi-
cal rights are often considered to be "negative" rights, that
governments respect by abstention and by inaction. But in fact
these so-called negative rights often require the state to pro-
vide relevant institutions, such as a legislature or an indepen-
dent judiciary. 3 Moreover, the state may be required to take
positive steps to ensure that a right is enjoyed or protected
against infringement by private parties. More importantly,
11. See Zaki Eusufzai, Do More Open Countries Have a Higher Growth Rate
But More Inequality?, 26 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 32, 33 (1998). See generally TARIQ
BANURi, ECONOIiC LIBERALIZATION: No PANACEA (1991).
12. See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 5, at n.25 ("As the trade liberalization atten-
dant to globalization reduces governmental barriers to private economic decision-
making, individuals have an increased scope for realizing such economic rights.").
13. For an extended discussion of this claim, see STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS
SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS (1999).
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international human rights law treats as fundamental not only
political and civil liberties but also rights to the satisfaction of
basic human needs and well-being. 4 So international human
rights-codified after the welfare state was nearly univer-
sal-imply a much broader and interventionist vision of gov-
ernment than that suggested by the dominant story. As Profes-
sor Henkin and others have properly emphasized, the underly-
ing vision is that of an activist state, not a hands-off night
watchman.
Perhaps surprisingly, much the same is true on the eco-
nomic side. The Bretton Woods architects, including Keynes,
wanted to avoid the problems of the interwar period:
destabilizing capital flows, volatile currencies and rampant
protectionism. But they valued international economic stability
over maximizing capital and goods flows. So they fixed ex-
change rates and left nations free to regulate capital flows. 5
Similarly, the GATT's drafters were far from doctrinaire
advocates of unfettered markets. As one U.S. negotiator later
stated: "No one was committed to 'free trade,' no one expected
anything like it: and the term does not appear in the
GATT.""6 A contemporaneous account by the lead U.S. negoti-
ator elaborates the point:
There is no hope that a multilateral trading system can be
maintained in the face of widespread and protracted unem-
ployment. Where the objectives of domestic stability and
international freedom come into conflict, the former will be
14. As encapsulated in Article 22 of the Universal Declaration: "Everyone, as
a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization,
through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the
organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 22, G-A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The Declaration goes on to pro-
claim, inter alia, the right to work, the right to just remuneration and to equal
pay for equal work, the right to join a trade union, the right to an adequate stan-
dard of living, and the right to education. Id. arts. 23, 25-26.
15. Thus, for example, the IMF Articles of Incorporation called for the "avoid-
ance of restrictions on payments for current transactions" only, and did not em-
brace capital account convertibility as an obligation or even a goal. See Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. VI, § 3, Dec. 27, 1945, 60
Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
16. William Diebold, Jr., From the ITO to GATT-And Back?, in THE
BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS
152, 158 (Orin Kirshner ed., 1996).
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given priority .... It would be futile to insist that stability
must always give way to freedom. The best that can be hoped
for is a workable compromise."
Instead, while seeking to reduce barriers to trade, the
GATT was also designed to promote domestic stability. Thus,
the world trading system actually rests upon a complex politi-
cal compromise: governments would provide unemployment
compensation, adjustment assistance and other domestic safety
nets in exchange for public support for liberalized trade. 8 So
while the GATT reduced tariffs and other barriers, it included
a diverse set of exceptions designed to protect a variety of
domestic social policies. 9 Indeed, as the GATT's drafters
might have predicted-and contrary to the teachings of the two
dominant stories--empirical studies repeatedly confirm that
the nations most open to international trade generally have
the highest rates of social spending."
In short, the founders of the Bretton Woods institutions
and the GATT were not committed to laissez-faire or market
fundamentalism. Rather, they were economic liberals commit-
ted to international markets, but this commitment was "em-
bedded" within a larger commitment to interventionist domes-
tic policies.2' They recognized that "[slocieties that benefit the
17. CLAM WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 131 (1949). See also Jacob
Viner, Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 612,
613 (1947) (noting that "[t]here are few free traders in the present-day world, no
one pays any attention to their views, and no person in authority anywhere advo-
cates free trade.").
18. For more on this grand political compromise, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The
Death of the Trade Regime (forthcoming).
19. For example, while art. XI of the GATT generally prohibits quantitative
restrictions, they are expressly permitted for balance of payments difficulties "re-
sult[ing] from domestic policies designed to secure full employment." General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.IAS. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. More recent trade liberalization efforts are often
accompanied by similar efforts to cushion the domestic impacts of liberalized trade.
A good recent example of this is the NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance
Program, which is designed to mitigate any negative impact the NAFTA might
have on U.S. workers. See NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program, 19
U.S.C. § 2331 (1996).
20. See generally PETER J. KATZENSTEIN, SMALL STATES IN WORLD MRKETS:
INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN EuROPE (1985); DANi RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE
Too FAR? (1997).
21. John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379, 393
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most from integration with the world economy are those that
have the complementary institutions at home that manage and
contain the conflicts that economic interdependence trig-
gers."22
To summarize, contrary to the implicit assumption under-
lying the two dominant stories, at their inception neither the
human rights nor the international economic regime sought a
minimalist state in the name of freedom. Rather, both presup-
posed activist, interventionist states.
IV. THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GLOBALIZED
MARKETS AND HuMAN RIGHTS
If the two leading stories are misleading, is there another
way to understand the relationship of globalization and rights?
Let me suggest a third story, one that is more textured and,
ultimately, more ambiguous.
We might analogize the situation to a series of geometrical
relationships. In the first story, globalization and human rights
are like parallel lines. They are mutually supportive. Progress
on one front produces progress on the other. In the
counterstory, globalization and human rights have an inverse
relationship, and are analogous to lines that move in opposite
directions. Increased globalization means increased exploita-
tion and instability, and decreased satisfaction of human
rights. But these two linear tales are historically inaccurate
and therefore misleading. Rather, I believe, it is more helpful
to understand the relationship between globalization and hu-
man rights as analogous to a double helix. That is, while the
two regimes started at the same time and with many common
political commitments, they quickly assumed different trajecto-
ries. At times they have moved promisingly in the same direc-
tion. At other times, they have intersected at cross purposes.
So, unlike the two dominant accounts, this is a story of histor-
ical and political contingency, of important but tentative gains
and missed opportunities. As I cannot detail all of this complex
story here, I will simply outline some of the main plot lines.
I have argued that the Post-War economic and human
(1982).
22. Dani Rodrik, Globalisation, Social Conflict and Economic Growth, 21
WORLD EcON. 143 (1998).
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rights regimes presupposed an activist state. Indeed, the social
welfare goals that governments promised to satisfy in ex-
change for support of liberalized trade overlap with many of
the social and economic rights guaranteed in the Universal
Declaration. So one might have imagined that the economic
and human rights regimes would be mutually supportive. But
soon thereafter, these two regimes began to move in different
directions. Let me illustrate by focusing on the United States,
and in particular shifting U.S. positions regarding economic
rights, as this issue has been particularly controversial."
This nation has not always been hostile to social and eco-
nomic rights. President Roosevelt included "freedom from
want" among the four freedoms, and in his 1944 State of the
Union message, urged adoption of an "Economic Bill of Rights,"
stating:
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true
individual freedom cannot exist without economic security
and independence. 'Necessitous men are not freemen.' People
who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dicta-
torships are made.
In our day these economic truths have become accepted
as self-evident. We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill
of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity
can be established for all-regardless of station, race, or
creed.
Among these are:
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the indus-
tries, or shops or farms or mines of the Nation;
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and
clothing and recreation;
23. While my focus here is on the United States, similar policy oscillations
occurred in other nations. See, e.g., Sally Morphet, Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: The Development of Governments' Views, 1941-88, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENT (Ralph Beddard & Dilys M.
Hill eds., 1992); AJ. Hobbins, Eleanor Roosevelt, John Humphrey, and Canadian
Opposition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 53 INrfL J. 325 (1998).
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The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products
at a return which will give him and his family a decent
living;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity
to achieve and enjoy good health;
The right to adequate protection from the economic
fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment;
The right to a good education.
All of these rights spell security. And after this war is won,
we must be prepared to move forward, in the implementation
of these rights, to new goals of human happiness and well-
being. America's own rightful place in the world depends in
large part upon how fully these and similar rights have been
carried into practice for our citizens. For unless there is secu-
rity here at home there cannot be lasting peace in the
world.'
At the dawn of the Age of Rights, the Truman Administra-
tion voted to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which is premised upon the equality and the indivisi-
bility of political and economic rights.' In addition to the fa-
miliar political and civil rights, the Universal Declaration
includes rights to, inter alia, a free public education, a stan-
dard of living adequate to health and well-being, social security
during sickness, disability and old age, and equal pay for equal
work.2
6
24. 90 CONG. REC. 55, 57 (1944).
25. The U.S. role in articulating the economic rights included in the Universal
Declaration has long been underappreciated. For a more detailed account, see
Louis B. Sohn, How American International Lawyers Prepared for the San Francis-
co Bill of Rights, 89 AM. J. INTL L. 540 (1995).
26. That different nations agreed to an article in the Universal Declaration
did not, of course, mean that they shared a common understanding of that
article's meaning. Article 23, for example, provides for a right to work. For the
United States, this meant the right to choose one's work (or, perhaps, not to
work); the state was obliged not to interfere with this right. To the Soviet Union,
the right to work meant that the state had a duty to provide employment and to
prevent unemployment.
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But U.S. policy soon moved in a different direction. As
Cold War tensions heightened, the United States began to
attack the very idea of social and economic rights. They were
said to be socialistic, or aspirational, or incapable of judicial
enforcement. They were, in short, not really rights at all.
But, as a helix twists and turns, so has U.S. policy on
economic and social rights. The 1970s saw a sharp turn in U.S.
attitudes, first in Congress and then, upon Jimmy Carter's
election, in the executive branch. Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance defined human rights to include the right to fulfillment
of such vital needs as shelter, food, health care and education.
In late 1977, President Carter signed the Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights.
The Reagan years marked yet another shift in this trajec-
tory. Again, the U.S. human rights policy was based upon "the
unqualified rejection of economic, social and cultural 'rights' as
rights,"27 in part as an element of larger Cold War strate-
gies.' A "highpoint" of this movement was a speech by a
State Department official seeking to dispel a number of
"myths" regarding human rights, the first of which was that
"'economic and social rights' constitute human rights."0
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc,
came the promise of a "new world order." Many hoped that the
United States would no longer reject economic and social rights
in the name of Cold War values. So, again, one might have
expected the two regimes would move in the same direction.
But instead of embracing economic and social rights, U.S.
policy moved in yet another direction. It endorsed the goal of
democratization, arguing that democratic institutions were the
most solid bulwarks of human rights."0 In short, on the
27. Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 365,
372 (1990).
28. I recognize that this account is overly simplified, and that there were
always counter trends. For example, as the United States was explicitly repudi-
ating these social and economic rights in the context of the Covenant, it was uni-
laterally insisting that other nations honor them in its trade legislation. But this
was a subplot in the larger story of cold war ideologies.
29. Paula Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, Address Before the American Council of Young Political
Leaders, Washington, D.C. (June 3, 1988), reprinted in DEPT. STATE, BUREAU OF
PUBLIC AFFAIRS, CURRENT POL'Y, No. 1091, 1988, at 2 (quoted in Alston, supra
note 27, at 374).
30. For a detailed account of the human rights community's ambivalent re-
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human rights side, the story is one of shifting U.S. commit-
ments to economic rights over time.
The other helix, the international economic helix, also had
a series of twists and turns. I'll mention only the most relevant
for our purposes, a turn away from the complex political bar-
gain that produced the Bretton Woods and GATT international
economic order, and toward globalization. Globalization is
characterized by widespread economic liberalization and tre-
mendous surges in international trade and investment.31 At
some point over the last 15 years, the vastly increased integra-
tion of international markets through new patterns of trade,
finance, production and capital flows-along with an increas-
ingly dense web of treaties and international institu-
tions-produced a qualitatively different world economy. As
footloose capital became less willing to fund the welfare state,
and threatened to flee to more inviting jurisdictions, nations
increasingly began to withdraw the safety nets that had al-
lowed workers to tolerate the dislocations of globalization. 2
Moreover, as a result of expanding International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and World Bank mandates and ever more intru-
sive GATT disciplines, governments discovered that they had
inadvertently subverted their ability to manage the disloca-
tions caused by economic liberalization.3 The political result,
as Multilateral Agreement on Investment proponents discov-
ered, has been an unraveling of the social bargain that sup-
ported formation of the postwar international economy.34
So, on the economic side of the helix, globalization's rise
threatens to invert the embedded liberalism compromise.
sponse to this push for democracy, see Thomas Carothers, Democracy and Human
Rights: Policy Allies or Rivals, WASH. Q., Summer 1994, at 109.
31. See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 5; Warner, supra note 6.
32. For example, while many studies suggest a high correlation between open-
ness and government expenditures, see Rodrik, supra note 22, a time series analy-
sis by Professor Rodrik reveals that, at some point, government expenditures on
social insurance goes down as openness, particularly openness to capital, goes up.
Some might interpret this as evidence of a game of global bait and switch. See
Paul B. Stephan, Book Review, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 246 (1997) (reviewing
DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? (1997)).
33. See, Dunoff, supra note 18.
34. The "defeat" of the MM at the OECD may lead to a transfer of negoti-
ations to the WTO. Ironically, this change of venue may actually decrease the
ability to negotiate an investment treaty that protects non-economic interests. See,
e.g., Environmentalists Claim Victory as Talks on Multilateral Investment Pact
Founder, 21 INTL ENVTL. REPTR. 1053, 1054 (1998).
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Where the international economy used to be embedded within,
and hence limited by, a larger commitment to the activist
state, it increasingly appears that the state is now limited by a
larger, globalized economy.35
These twists and turns regarding the status of economic
and social rights and the embedded liberalism compromise are
fundamental to a historically sensitive account of the unfolding
relationship between international markets and international
human rights. Unlike the two dominant stories, the story I
wish to outline is marked by a series of shifting commitments
that have ebbed and flowed over time. But these shifting com-
mitments, both within and among nations, suggest that the
simple linear relationships between international markets and
human rights contained in the two dominant stories are mis-
leading.
V. A WAY AHEAD
Where does this leave us? Stories are supposed to have a
message, or a moral. But the messages here are neither simple
nor straightforward. Let me mention a few. As the current
East Asian financial crises confirms, it is a mistake to think
that the state is now irrelevant. Through the policies they
enact, the practices they adopt and the safety nets they pro-
vide, states still have a major role in determining whether
globalization will, in the end, turn out to be more friend than
foe of human rights. At the same time, as Professor Henkin
correctly emphasized, non-state actors play increasingly impor-
tant roles in these areas. 6 Rights can be enjoyed in the pri-
vate sphere,37  and non-state actors can violate human
rights.38 Multinational businesses, in particular, can pro-
foundly affect human rights through the adoption of codes of
conduct, promotion of "best practices," and establishment of
35. See, Dunoff, supra note 18.
36. See, Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of
Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INVL L. 17, 22 (1999). See, e.g., Barbara A. Frey,
The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the Protec-
tion of International Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153 (1997);
Jennifer L. Johnson, Public-Private-Public Convergence: How the Private Actor Can
Shape Public International Labor Standards, 24 BROOK J. INT'L L. 291 (1998).
37. See generally ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMIAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE
(1993).
38. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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benchmarks."
Stories are supposed to have a beginning, a middle and an
end. However, the story I have offered is radically incomplete.
But this, of course, is the larger point. The abbreviated history
I have outlined is meant to suggest a contingency to
globalization's effects that is missing from the other stories.
While both the synergy story and the counterstory present a
logic of inevitability, I would suggest that globalized markets
are neither inherently a friend nor a foe of human rights.
While increased economic openness is often associated with
increased national wealth, and can promote progress on other
measures of well being, such as nutrition or education, we
simply cannot answer in the abstract the ultimate effects of
markets and globalization on human rights and social justice
for any particular society.
The critical issue is whether there is anything we can do
to try to ensure that globalization is more friend than foe of
human rights. This Symposium will, I expect, help spark an
ongoing effort to address this issue in theoretic and strategic
terms. Let me offer two suggestions.
First, consider how the concept of "development" has
evolved in the past 10 or 20 years. In the 1970s, scholars be-
gan to argue that economic growth does not necessarily trans-
late into improvements in non-income measures of well-being,
such as literacy or life expectancy. This, in turn, sparked a
vigorous critique of an overly narrow conception of "economic
development." As a result, the World Bank and IMF now work
with substantially enriched conceptions of development-and
are considerably more sensitive to the human rights implica-
tions of economic development. 0 An interesting and some-
what similar debate is occurring over the traditional under-
standing of "rights," and an alternative vocabulary is being
developed to describe people's basic entitlements.41 Unfortu-
39. See, e.g., Mary Robinson, Address Before the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, The Business Case for Human Rights, (Nov. 11, 1997) available at
<http://www.unhchr.ch/>.
40. To be sure, there is still ample room for improvement. For more on the
Bank and the Fund in this context, see Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the
IMF, and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 47 (1996).
41. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 273 (1997); Amartya Sen, Capability and Well Being, in THE
QUALMTY OF LIFE 30 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993); MAHBUB UL
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nately, no similar debate has occurred in the trade world. I
fear that many trade officials and scholars start from the
(false) premise that there is a deep opposition between "gov-
ernment intervention" and "free trade,"42 and have an overly
narrow understanding of the effects of trade and market liber-
alization. But trade in various markets has different conse-
quences for economic development, let alone human rights.
International bodies have just started to gather data on these
relationships,43 and trade scholars could make few more im-
portant contributions than to initiate a significant dialogue
over these issues."
Second, if we want to ensure that international markets
are friends of human rights, we need to return to first princi-
ples. Here are a few: liberalized global markets are neither
"natural" nor ends in themselves.4" They are simply means to
an end. And, as instruments, or tools, they should be evaluated
by the effects they produce. Moreover, as the East Asian finan-
cial crisis demonstrates, unfettered markets pose unacceptable
risks, and some level of state regulation of markets is neces-
sary. Thus, the critical debate ought to be over how, in any
particular instance, to make markets and government work as
partners in development. Finally, and perhaps most important-
ly, the achievement of human rights and social justice is a
higher value than the protection of free markets. With these
principles in mind, we can help ensure that globalization will
advance human rights.
HAQ, REFLECTIONS ON HuMAN DEVELOPMENT (1995). See also UNITED NATIONS
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993 (measuring quality of
life in different nations by focusing on longevity (measured by life expectancy),
knowledge (measured by mean years of schooling and literacy) and standard of liv-
ing (measured by income relative to the poverty level)).
42. I've argued elsewhere that international markets presuppose government
intervention. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade and: Recent Developments in
Trade Policy and Scholarship-and Their Surprising Political Implications, 17 NW.
J. INT'L L. & BuS. 759 (1997).
43. For example, the Governing Body of the ILO created a Working Body on
the Social Dimensions of Liberalization of International Trade in 1993. For a prog-
ress report on this body's work, see ILO Doc. GB.274/WP/SDLI2 (1999).
44. Paradoxically, the Asian collapse and Russian default open the space for
these conversations because they undermine the notion that there is an inevitabili-
ty about globalization and its effects.
45. See, Dunoff, supra note 18.
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